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THE LABOR PREEMPTION DOCTRINE: HAMILTONIAN
RENAISSANCE OR LAST HURRAH?
DAVID

L.

GREGORY*

I. INTRODUCTION

The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution' is the
foundation of federal preemption in areas of overriding national
interest. The commerce clause of the Constitution2 provides the
means for legislative solutions to national problems. Through its
commerce power, Congress has regulated labor relations, and generally has enjoyed the broad judicial deference historically accorded to congressional regulation of commerce.3
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. B.A., 1973, Catholic University
of America; M.B.A., 1977, Wayne State University; J.D., 1980, University of Detroit; LL.M.,
1982, Yale University.
This article is drawn from one chapter of my J.S.D. dissertation in progress, to be submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of the Science of Law
at the Yale University School of Law. I thank Professor Jack Getman for his many invaluable comments on earlier drafts.
1. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The supremacy clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id. In interpreting the supremacy clause, Cluef Justice Marshall once noted:
[Tihe States have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general
government. This is, we think, the unavoidable consequence of that supremacy
which the constitution has declared.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819); see Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)
(states excluded from regulating interstate commerce because the Constitution grants that
power to Congress).
3. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (Congress' use of the
commerce power to regulate labor relations through the National Labor Relations Act held
constitutional). For a thorough examination of the application of the commerce clause to
labor regulation, see Gregory, Constitutional Limitations on the Regulation of Union and
Employer Conduct, 49 MICH. L. Rv. 191 (1950).
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For the past quarter century, however, the Supreme Court consistently has undercut the labor preemption doctrine, which applies the federal preemption principles of the supremacy clause to
labor relations issues. Concomitantly, the Court implicitly has repudiated some of the core theories underlying both the supremacy
clause and the commerce clause. As a result, the judicial erosion
has extended beyond the labor preemption doctrine into the
broader area of federal labor policy. Ascertaining whether the constitutional decay began with the erosion of the labor preemption
doctrine or with the broader collapse of federal labor policy misperceives the mquiry; the labor preemption doctrine and labor policy are inextricably interrelated.
In addition to these constitutional precepts, the labor preemption doctrine is grounded in the National Labor Relations Act 4
(NLRA). Although the NLRA is no longer the sole source of employment law, 5 it remains at the heart of federal labor policy 6 The
NLRA now is a mature statute with a fifty-year history, but
whether it is enjoying a golden anniversary is the subject of considerable debate.7 Although the many established exceptions to the

4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
5. Employment law has several other active cutting edges, including federal statutes such
as the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-309,
441, 1001-1461 (West 1985 & Supp. 1986), title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982), and the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29
U.S.C.A. §§ 553, 671-678 (West 1985), as well as state statutes governing matters such as
workers' compensation. Another increasingly important source of employment law is the
protection against unjust discharge extended to nonunionized employees through statutes
and, more often, through case law in a growing number of jurisdictions. See, e.g., Pugh v.
See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981); Toussaint v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc.,
99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257 (1985); see also Summers, Individual ProtectionAgainst Unjust
Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481 (1976) (advocating protection against
arbitrary and unjust dismissal from employment).
6. Most of the post-NLRA employment law has reflected the NLRA's labor law policy.
See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982).
7. See, e.g., Gregory & Mak, Significant Decisions of the NLRB, 1984: The Reagan
Board's "Celebration"of the 50th Anniversary of the National Labor Relations Act, 18
CONN. L. REv. 7 (1985). Several recent labor law symposia also have examined the status and
role of the NLRA at this historic juncture. See, e.g., Labor and Employment Law: A New
Focus for the Eighties, 62 DEN. U.L. Rav. 389 (1985); Symposium: The Role of Unions in
the 1980's, 52 FORDHAM L. Rv. 1061 (1984); The ConceptualFoundationsof Labor Law: A
SymposIUm, 51 U. CHL L. Rv. 945 (1984); see also St. Antoine, Federal Regulation of the
Workplace in the Next Half Century, 61 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 631 (1985) (summarizing the
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integrated labor preemption doctrine8 of the NLRA appear valid
when considered alone, the cumulative effect of these exceptions is
an unacceptable fragmentation of the doctrine without a sufficient
offsetting contribution to labor and employment policy Centralization of labor policy is essential because the NLRA, despite its political defects," is far better suited to anchor and to guide the development of labor policy than are the fifty separate states. If labor
policy loses this centralization, state courts will yield a volatile
checkerboard of inconsistent decisions, and labor law practice will
disintegrate into raw forum shopping.
The judicial erosion of the labor preemption doctrine has debilitated federal labor law policy. Fueled by the Supreme Court's
usual predisposition to find against preemption in labor cases for

positions of current critics and defenders of the NLRA); Weiler, Milestone or Tombstone:
The Wagner Act at Fifty, 23 HA v. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1986) (cautioning labor law theoreticians

and labor leaders about the need to reexamine and to reform fundamental labor law
precepts); Willborn, IndustrialDemocracy and the National Labor Relations Act: A Preliminary Inquiry, 25 B.C.L. REv. 725 (1984) (arguing that the NLRA has failed to live up to
its expectations).
8. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); infra notes 71-89
and accompanying text.
9. Political controversy has characterized the entire history of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which administers the NLRA. During the Board's first decade, employers criticized the NLRB as a tool of organized labor. Cf., e.g., What Business Thinks,
FORTUNE, Oct. 1939, at 52 (business criticism of New Deal legislation and of labor unions).
This criticism prompted Congress to extend the coverage of the NLRA to unfair practices
by labor unions. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 140-188 (1982). The political controversy and debate has continued, and has accelerated
in this decade. See, e.g., HousE COMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS, DELAY, SLOWNESS IN DECISION
MAKING, AND THE CASE BACKLOG AT THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, HI. REP. No.
1141, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1984) (concluding that the NLRB faced an administrative
crisis because of procedural delays and case backlogs); HOUSE SUscouM. ON LABOR MGMT.
RELATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 98TH CONG, 2D SESS THm FAILURE OF
LABOR LAW-A BERlAYAL OF AMERICAN WORKERS 26 (Comm. Print 1984) (criticizing the

performance and the perceived anti-labor philosophy of the NLRB); Criticism of Labor Department, 115 LAB. REL. REi. (BNA) 195 (Mar. 5, 1984) (reporting statement by Lane Kirkland, president of the AFL-CIO, characterizing NLRB members during the Reagan Administration as "anti-labor ideologues" and as advocates of "the most narrow, retrograde
employer interests").
This controversy may be more virtue than vice. The highly politicized nature of the
NLRB gives the Board the ability to shape evolving labor policy to respond to changing
political contexts. See Gregory, The National Labor Relations Board and the Politics of
Labor Law, 27 B.C.L. REv. 39 (1985); Summers, Politics, Policy Making, and the NLRB, 6
SYRACUSE L. REv. 93 (1954); supra note 7.
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most of the past quarter century,10 labor law decisionmaking has
devolved into little more than ineffectual crisis management. Absent restoration of the labor preemption doctrine, labor policy
could deteriorate into a state of total confusion analogous to the
doctrinal chaos afflicting capital punishment cases in criminal
law 11

10. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
Apart from the labor preemption doctrine, the Burger Court led a more general "states'
rights" assault on centralized national authority through revitalization of the tenth and
eleventh amendments. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89
(1984) (holding that federal courts have no jurisdiction to order state officials to comply
with state law). The Court's recent decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985) (subjecting localities to the federal minimum wage law), in which the
Court overruled National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), arguably signaled
the last hurrah of the nationalist wing of the Court. The elevation of Justice Rehnquist to
the position of Chief Justice, however, as well as other factors, will guarantee that the broad
ideological and jurisprudential assault on nationalism will continue. See Garcia, 105 S. Ct.
at 1033 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (observing that the principle in National League of Cities "will, I am confident, in time again command the support of a majority of this Court");
see also Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2371 (1985)
(holding that the FDA does not preempt local blood donor regulations). For thorough analyses of the rich history of federalism, see Amyx, New Federalism:How Is It Working?, 15
WASHBURN L.J. 229 (1976); Catz & Lenard, The Demise of the Implied Federal Preemption
Doctrine, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295 (1977); Fein, The Waning and Waxing of Federalism,
A.B.A. J., Jan. 1, 1986, at 118; Gabel, The Mass Psychology of the New Federalism:How the
Burger Court's PoliticalImagery Legitimizes the Privatization of Everyday Life, 52 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 263 (1984); Lamb, "New Federalism"and Civil Rights, 9 U. TOL. L. REV. 816
(1978); Powell, The Compleat Jeffersonian:Justice Rehnquist and Federalism,91 YALE L.J.
1317 (1982); Rehnquist, Point, Counterpoint:The Evolution of American Political Philosophy, 34 VAND. L. REv. 249 (1981); Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution,54 Tax.
L. REv. 693 (1976); Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst
Case, 98 HARV. L. REv. 61 (1984); Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH.
L. REV. 1709 (1985); Werhan, Pullman Abstention After Pennhurst: A Comment on Judicial
Federalism, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 449 (1986); Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting
Perspectives on Federalismand the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, Shifting Perspectives]; Note, The Burger Court and Labor Preemption
Doctrine: Federalism in the Balance, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1233 (1985); Note, Judicial
Examination of Deregulation:Exploring the Boundaries of Executive Discretion, 59 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 86 (1984); Note, SeparatingMyth from Reality in FederalismDecisions: A
Perspective of American Federalism-Pastand Present, 35 VAND. L. REv. 161 (1982); Note,
Taking FederalismSeriously: Limiting State Acceptance of National Grants, 90 YALE L.J.
1694 (1981).
11. With virtually every case, criminal law jurisprudence becomes more fragmented. The
landmark capital punishment cases of McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), and
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), best exemplify the confusion. In McGautha, the
Court held that the jury had absolute discretion to decide whether to impose the death
penalty. 402 U.S. at 207. One year later, however, the Court suggested in Furman that the
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Fortunately, all hope for recentralized labor law theory and
practice is not lost. Although the labor preemption doctrine largely
remains an ensnared Gulliver, left to the mercies of the state
courts by an irresponsible Congress and, until very recently, by the
"states' rights" jurisprudence of the Burger Court, the doctrine has
not yet been rent completely asunder. In 1986, the Supreme Court
may have begun the return to a refined labor preemption doctrine 12 and to a responsible national labor policy that ultimately
would obviate the need for legislative reform.1 3
This Article advocates the renaissance of the labor preemption
doctrine. The Article begins by synthesizing the constitutional basis of the doctrine, and then examines the application of these
principles by the Supreme Court. Rather than reviewing the entire
fifty-year compilation of case law, the Article highlights the salient
early labor preemption cases, tracing the development of the

eighth amendment mandated courts to give juries standards regarding the death penalty.
See 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring). For comprehensive analyses of the confused
judicial treatment of capital punishment issues, see R BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT'S OBSTACLE COURSE (1982); W. BowERs, LEGAL Homiicin
MENT IN AMERICA, 1864-1982 (1984).

DEATH AS PUNISH-

12. The Burger Court, with near unanimity, surprisingly endorsed a broad view of the
labor preemption doctrine in three cases decided m 1986. See International Longshoremen's
Ass'n v. Davis, 106 S. Ct. 1904 (1986); znfra note 395; Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of
Los Angeles, 106 S. Ct. 1395 (1986); infra notes 366-95 and accompanying text; Wisconsin
Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 106 S. Ct. 1057 (1986); infra notes
341-65 and accompanying text.
13. Previous attempts at legislative reform of the NLRA generally have been unsuccessful. The last significant attempt to amend the NLRA, the Labor Reform Act of 1977, H.R.
8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 23,712, failed to pass the Senate. See 124 CONG.
REc. 18,400 (recommitting the bill to the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, from which it
never emerged). Congress has adopted only two significant amendments since the NLRA
was passed in 1935. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 140-188 (1982); Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of
1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158-160, 164, 186-187, 401-531 (1982).
According to one commentator, Congress' mability to address the labor preemption docunrealistic to look to Congress for particular changes in this
trine indicates that "lilt is
branch of labor law." Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HAIIv. L. REv. 1337, 1377
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Cox, PreemptionRevisited]. This commentator explains: "[Flew
senators or representatives have the time or patience to study out all the implications of
federalism in labor law and then formulate a workable generalization. To write the generalization into a statute would scarcely be wise even if it were feasible." Cox, Federalism in the
Law of Labor Relations, 67 HAv. L. REv. 1297, 1346-47 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Cox,
Federalism];see also infra notes 28 & 395 and accompanying text (noting the lack of an
express directive from Congress concerning the labor preemption doctrine).

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:507

doctrine up to the Court's landmark decision in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon.14 The Article then reviews the key
subseqent decisions in which the Garmon doctrine has been applied. This analysis reveals that, while the Court's approach to the
doctrine has been contradictory and generally hostile, some recent
cases offer hope for eventual full restoration of the doctrine.
The Article concludes that the Supreme Court should lead the
return to a discriminating, refined approach that would vest labor
law decisionmaking with the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), absent compelling countervailing considerations. Of
course, this new approach cannot be rigid and absolute. The panoply of federal and state employment laws generally should be retained because the NLRA cannot encapsulate all labor and employment law theory and practice. Allowance must be made for the
operation of healthy Brandeisian pluralism.15 A revitalized labor
preemption doctrine and a centralized national labor policy, however, could be the underpinning for a new, proactive labor law jurisprudence extending into the twenty-first century Whether 1986
will represent the renaissance of the labor preemption doctrine, or
its last hurrah, will hinge on resolution of the tension between the
rejuvenated nationalist spirit and the states' rights jurisprudence
of the new Rehnquist Court.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LABOR PREEMPTION

DOCTRINE

Through the United States Constitution, the people of the several states delegated exclusive power to the federal government in
many enumerated areas. 6 In some enumerated areas, the
supremacy clause 17 operates so that federal law totally preempts
state law. Total preemption classically occurs in four situations:
first, when Congress passes express preemptive legislation;", second, when comprehensive federal regulation in a particular area
impels a reasonable inference that Congress intended to leave no

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

359 U.S. 236 (1959).
See znfra note 22 and accompanying text.
See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 320 (1851).
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see supra note 1.
See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
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room for concurrent state regulation; 19 third, when a "federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject"; 0 and
fourth, when state law in an area actually or potentially would conflict with federal law or with congressional objectives.2 1 In other
enumerated areas, the states generally have concurrent power. In
most nonenumerated areas, reflecting Brandeisian pluralism," the
states theoretically retain exclusive authority by operation of the
tenth amendment.2 3 This scheme represents the classic constitutional calculus in the federal system. As one commentator put it,
"[T]he very first principle of American constitutionalism is
2' 4
federalism.

19. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
20. Id.
21. See Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982); Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963); Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
22. The Burger Court may be primarily responsible for the contemporary revitalization of
states' rights jurisprudence, but it did not invent the concept. Healthy pluralism, according
great deference to the states, was strongly supported by Justice Brandeis more than a half
century ago. In New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932), Justice Brandeis
stated:
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to
the nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory, and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.
Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The Court has continued to enunciate a Jeffersonian concept of states' rights throughout
the past quarter century. In Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981), for
example, the Court stated:
[T]he "'exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed.'" As we
recently reiterated "[p]re-emption of state law by federal statute or regulation
is not favored 'in the absence of persuasive reasons-either that the nature of
the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress
has unmistakably so ordained."'
Id. at 522 (citations omitted) (quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 203 (1952), and
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963)); see also P. BATOR,
P. MISHKIN,D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL CouRTs AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTsM 470-71 (2d ed. 1973) ("Federal law is generally interstitial m nature.
Congress acts, in short, against the background of the total corpus juns of the
states in much the way that a state legislature acts against the background of the common
law.
").
23. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
24. Freeman, Dynamic Federalism and the Concept of Preemption, 21 DEPAuL L. REv.
630, 637 (1972).
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The preemption doctrine defines the precise contours of federal
and state authority over substantive legal matters. This doctrine,
Which has been described as "one of the more intricate structures
of legal theory, 2 5 determines what areas of law are reserved to the
exclusive authority of the federal government and what areas are
left to exclusive or concurrent state regulation.2 6
In the context of labor preemption, the difficult task of defining
federal and state authority ultimately is left to the Supreme
Court 27 because of Congress' inaction and its failure to address the
complexities of the issue. 28 The Court often has been nonplussed
by both the semantic confusion and the self-engendered substantive confusion surrounding general preemption principles.2 9 The
predictable consequence generally is further obfuscation. The

25. Comment, Federal Preemption in Labor Relations, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 128 (1968).
26. See id.
The preemption doctrine has antecedents in English law. According to Blackstone, preemption was the first priority right of the Crown to purchase necessary commodities before

the general citizenry. 1 W. BLACKSTONE,

COMMENTARIES

*287; see Freeman, supra note 24, at

630 n.1.
27. See Michelman, State Power to Govern Concerted Employee Activities, 74 HARv. L.
REv. 641, 681 (1961); Wellington, Labor and the Federal System, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 542
(1959); Note, Labor Law-Preemption-Lodge 76, International Association of Machinists
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (Kearney), 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV.
494, 498 (1977); Comment, supra note 25.
28. According to one commentary.
[P]roblems of supremacy and accommodation are essentially issues of legislative policy.
Yet it is the practice for Congress to avoid the decision, thus
leaving the problems to the Supreme Court. And the Court, paradoxically,
then draws the necessary lines by asking-in form if not in actuality-where
Congress drew them.
Cox & Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 HARv. L. REv. 211, 212 (1950). This
congressional inaction has not escaped the attention of the Court:
Congress has never said a word about pre-emption of state-court jurisdiction.
"The National Labor Management Relations Act, as we have before
pointed out, leaves much to the states, though Congress has refrained from
telling us how much. We must spell out from conflicting indications of congressional will the area in which state action is still permissible."
International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Davis, 106 S. Ct. 1904, 1917-18 (1986) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union No. 776, 346
U.S. 485, 488 (1953)); see also infra note 395 and accompanying text (quoting another opmion of Justice Rehnquist noting the same problem).
29. A frequently quoted phrase from Justice Frankfurter aptly describes the Court's
unenviable but indispensable task when it addresses preemption issues. According to Justice
Frankfurter: "The statutory implications concerning what has been taken from the States
and what has been left to them are of a Delphic nature, to be translated into concreteness
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Court, according to one commentator, "has never articulated a single, distinct formula for determining when the doctrine operates to
preclude or limit state action. 3 0 The observation that "the Supreme Court has not yet faced the question of the true

by the process of litigating elucidation." International Ass'n of Macimists v. Gonzaies, 356
U.S. 617, 619 (1958).
The problem was addressed in greater detail in an earlier decision:
This Court, in considering the validity of state laws m the light of treaties or
federal laws touching the same subject, has made use of the following expressions: conflicting; contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and interference. But none of
these expressions provides an infallible constitutional test or an exclusive constitutional yardstick. In the final analysis, there can be no one crystal clear
distinctly marked formula.
Little aid can be derived from the vague and illusory but often repeated
formula that Congress "by occupying the field" has excluded from it all state
legislation. Every Act of Congress occupies some field, but we must know the
boundaries of that field before we can say that it has precluded a state from
the exercise of any power reserved to it by the Constitution. To discover the
boundaries we look to the federal statute itself, read in the light of its constitutional setting and its legislative history.
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 78-79 (1941) (footnote omitted); see also supra note 28
(noting lack of congressional direction to guide labor preemption decisions); infra note 395
and accompanying text (same).
Although Hines was not a labor preemption case, it is significanf because it was the first
case in which the Court found a congressional intent to preempt state law when the federal
law was not passed under the commerce clause of the Constitution. The Court held that the
Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670, which required aliens to register with
the federal government and to carry identification cards, preempted a similar Pennsylvania
law. 312 U.S. at 74. Hines represented the emergence of an activist policymakmg Court in
the preemption context:
Hines broke new constitutional ground. The Court redefined the judicial function in preemption cases, demanding a determination whether the state statute
under scrutiny "stands as an obstacle to the full purpose and objectives of
Congress." This approach substituted a purportedly objective assessment of
the needs attending a statute's operation for the practice of defining the occupied field through total reliance upon Congress' subjective will. It amounted to
a judicial assumption of competence to find preemption, notwithstanding the
absence of clear congressional intent to occupy the field or actual conflict,
when the nature of the federal regulation called for exclusive operation.
Note, Shifting Perspectives, supra note 10, at 631 (emphasis by the Court) (footnotes
omitted).
30. Benke, The Apparent Reformation of Garmon: Its Effect on the Federal Preemption
of Concerted Trepassory Union Activity, 9 U. TOL. L. REv. 793 (1978) (footnote omitted).
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constitutional place of preemption, 3 1 made in 1972, unfortunately
remains true today.
Classic preemption analysis is grounded in the supremacy clause
and in Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce. 2 In
context of labor relations, the Supreme Court has construed the
commerce power broadly to sustain comprehensive federal statutory regulation. 3 In tandem with the supremacy clause, this broad
commerce power often sanctions exclusive federal authority, and
thus preempts state regulation. 4 Much concurrent state regulation
of labor relations, however, has escaped preemption. Because Congress did not include express preemption provisions within the
NLRA, the Court in labor relations cases must inquire "whether a
particular kind of state legislative or judicial action conflicts with
federal policy to a degree sufficient to justify suppression of the
action on the authority of the Supremacy Clause."3 5
The Supreme Court generally begins preemption analysis by examining congressional intent. The Court first attempts to ascertain
the existence and extent of the congressional intent to preempt a
particular field, and then attempts to determine whether the particular state conduct falls within the area that Congress intended
to preempt. 8 Unfortunately, this analysis is rarely expeditious or
convenient. Congressional intent often is hopelessly obtuse and inscrutable, if not entirely absent.3 7 Consequently, judicial deference
to legislative intent usually is an exercise in futility Frustrated by
Congress' failure to speak, the Court is forced to act by congressional default. The core reality in preemption doctrine is judicial

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See Freeman, supra note 24, at 631 (footnote omitted).
See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945).
Comment, supra note 25, at 131.

36. See td.
37. In the landmark labor preemption case, San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236 (1959), Justice Frankfurter confessed the frustration inherent in judicial attempts to ascertain congressional intent. Id. at 240. Justice Rehnquist recently echoed these
problems in his dissent in Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 106 S. Ct.
1395, 1403 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Many commentators also have noted this difficulty. See Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdictionover Labor Relations, 59 COLUm L. Ray. 6, 9 (1959); Michelman, supra note 27, at 647-48; Wellington, supra
note 27, at 545; Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REv. 208 (1959); Comment, supra note 25, at 131.
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policymaking in the face of congressional silence, disguised by the
occasional cosmetic judicial "divination of congressional purpose"
and "fabrication of 'intent.' "38 Judicial discernment of legislative
intent usually is a myth designed to camouflage judicial policymaking. Nowhere is the problem any more apparent than in labor
preemption. 9
Even if legislative intent were clear, however, labor preemption
decisions still would have to transcend mechanistic determinations.
Only the Court properly can make these complex policy decisions
because they are not the product of statutory construction alone;
they also are the product of overriding federalism and supremacy
principles grounded in the Constitution.4 0 After ascertaining,
manipulating, inventing, or abandoning the fruitless search for legislative intent, the Court must undertake a constitutional analysis
in every preemption decision, balancing federal and state interests. 41 Because of the need for this balancing, Congress in the labor
preemption area could provide only a general preemption principle
to guide the Court. Even with such a principle, the Court still
would have to apply its usual two-step constitutional preemption
analysis, ascertaining whether a constitutional conflict exists between federal and state law42 and whether national uniformity is
necessary to address problems that are national in scope.4 3
This constitutional analysis does not mandate an all-encompassmg, inflexible labor preemption doctrine that precludes any and all
38. See Michelnan, supra note 27, at 648.

39. See infra note 205 and accompanying text (noting that even justices on the same side
of the Court's decision in New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S.
519 (1979), had difficulty agreeing on the congressional intent underlying the NLRA); see
also infra note 395 and accompanying text (noting problems ascertaining intent underlying
the NLRA in light of Congress' silence concerning its preemptive effect).
40. Note, supra note 37, at 224 ("Pre-emption can never be the product of statutory construction alone, since the Court and only the Court can make the final judgment of incompatibility required by the supremacy clause."); see also Michelnan, States' Rights and
States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86

YALx L.J. 1165 (1977); Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism
and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARv. L. Ray. 1065 (1977);
Note, A Framework for Preemption Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363 (1978).
41. See Comment, supra note 25, at 132.
42. See Note, Shifting Perspectives,supra note 10, at 625-26; Note, FederalPreemption:
Governmental Interests and the Role of the Supreme Court, 1966 DuKE L.J. 484.
43. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963);
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319-20 (1851).

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:507

state resolution of labor issues." That extreme would be nearly as
abhorrent to an integrated labor law jurisprudence as the current
morass of fragmented state court labor decisions. Labor preemption best is posed as "the troublesome, teasing, and vexing question: on what terms shall the national labor
statute and the sur9 '45
rounding legal system live with each other
Although difficult, the question is not insoluble. The best answer
would be a flexible but strong labor preemption doctrine that
would recentralize most labor law adjudication within the ambit of
the NLRA and within the jurisdiction of the NLRB. This approach would protect the national labor law structure from state
fragmentation. The result would be consonant with Hamiltonian"
federalism, which prefers a strong national government to the Jeffersonian 47 alternative of a pro forma central government dominated by virtually autonomous states. 48 A revitalized Hamiltonian

labor preemption doctrine ultimately would lead to more stable
and coherent labor law theory and practice.
44. Professor Archibald Cox, the leading authority on labor preemption, has suggested
that "preemption should extend to, but should also be confined to, those cases in which the
relief sought under state law is based upon a judgment that focuses upon the interests of
employers, unions, employees, and the general public in employee self-organization, collective bargaining, or a labor-management dispute." Cox, Recent Developments in FederalLabor Law Preemption, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 277, 281 (1980).
45. Brody, Labor Preemption Again-After the Searing of Garmon, 13 Sw. L.J. 201, 202
(1982) (footnotes omitted).
46. "Hamiltonian" refers to Alexander Hamilton's philosophy of a powerful central federal government. Hamilton coauthored the FederalistPapers with James Madison. These
powerful essays, designed to promote ratification of the Constitution, remain the principal
elucidation of the Constitution and of our republican form of government. For general background concerning the foundations of Hamiltonian federalism, see D. EPSTEIN, THE POLrICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST (1984); C. ROSSiTER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE CONSTITUTION (1964); L. WHrE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY (1948);
Hurst, Alexander Hamilton, Law Maker, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 483 (1978).
47. "Jeffersonian" refers to Thomas Jefferson's philosophy of decentralized government,
with power vested primarily in state and local governments. For general background concerning the foundations of the Jeffersoman philosophy, see C. PATTERSON, THE CONSTrruTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (1953).
48. The terms "Hamiltonian" and "Jeffersonman" are simple synopses, culled from the
rich political and philosophical history of federalism. "Federalism" continues to be manipulated across the political spectrum. For example, the Reagan Administration's "new federalism" is the current rubric for revitalizing states' rights and for shifting power away from the
federal government. "New federalism" stands Hamiltonian federalism on its head. See
supra notes 10 & 46-47 (citing authorities analyzing the historical and current connotations
of "federalism").
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Unfortunately, the Court's answers to labor preemption questions for more than a quarter century generally have been unsatisfactory. From early national dominance, troubled coexistence
marked an interim period that ushered in the fragmentation and
debilitation of federal labor policy. The following sections trace the
early establishment of the doctrine and its subsequent erosion. 9
III. INITIAL SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION OF THE LABOR

PREEMPTION DOCTRINE

A. Early Cases
50
Under the NLRA, labor-related activities either are protected,
are prohibited as "unfmr labor practices, ' 51 or are neither protected nor prohibited. 2 Analysis of activities using these statutory
categorizations, rather than the less tangible, nonstatutory, and
broader structual analysis employed in more recent cases, once was
the dominant means of resolving labor preemption questions.5 3 In
the first two decades following enactment of the NLRA, the Court

49. This Article does not attempt an exhaustive treatment of individual cases because, as
other commentators already have observed, numerous voluminous studies of early labor preemption cases already exist. See, e.g., Benke, supra note 30; Brody, supra note 45; Brody,
Federal Preemption Comes of Age in Labor Relations, 5 LAB.L.J. 743 (1954); Come, Federal
Preemption of Labor-ManagementRelations: Current Problems in the Application of Garmon, 56 VA. L. REv.1435 (1970); Come, FederalPreemption Since Garmon, 17 LAB. LJ.195
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Come, Since Garmon]; Cox, Federalism, supra note 12; Cox,
Preemption Revisited, supra note 12; Cox, supra note 44; Cox & Seidman, supra note 28;
Hafer, A PragmaticArticle Concerning Federal Preemption and Labor Law, 1960 Wis. L.
REv. 279; Hays, Federalism and Labor Relations in the United States, 102 U. PA. L REV.
959 (1954); Hooton, The Exceptional Garmon Doctrine, 26 LAB. LJ.49 (1975); Knee, Federal Supremacy in Labor Management Relations, 27 FoRDHAM L Ray. 373 (1958); Meltzer,
supra note 37; Michelman, supra note 27; Rose, The Labor Management Relations Act and
the State's Power to Grant Relief, 39 VA. L Rav. 765 (1953); Roumell & Schlesinger, The
Preemption Dilemma in Labor Relations, 18 U. Dmr. L.J. 17 (1954); Smith, The Taft-Hartley Act and State Jurisdictionover Labor Relations, 46 MICH. L REv. 593 (1948); Updegraff, Preemption, Predictabilityand Progress in Labor Law, 17 HAsTiNGS LJ. 473 (1966);
Wellington, supra note 27; Woll & St. Antoine, Who Goes There?: Recent Moves Along the
Federal-StateFront in Labor Law, 11 SYAcusE L. Rav. 1 (1959).
50. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
51. See id. § 158(a)-(b).
52. One commentator has noted that "in practice it was often difficult to determine
whether a given action was protected or prohibited, and if prohibited, whether this foreclosed the use of supplemental remedies by state courts." Comment, supra note 25, at 140
(footnote omitted).
53. See id. at 133.
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routinely decided that the Act preempted any conduct that it
4
5

regulated.

Under this statutory analysis, exceptions to the general rule of
preemption developed in areas of conduct that were not governed
directly by federal law. The most notable exception to federal preemption was regulation of violence associated with labor unrest,
which was left to the states.5 5 The violence exception was part of
the larger exception for inherently local concerns. 6 In contrast to
decisions in the past two decades, in which the Court has interpreted these exceptions so broadly that they threaten to swallow
the classic preemption rules, 57 the Court interpreted these local ex-

ceptions narrowly in early cases.
In cases involving violent labor activity, the Supreme Court cautioned state courts to separate locally regulable violence from protected labor conduct to which the preemption doctrine applied.58
54. See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947)
(state agency could not certify bargaining representatives for supervisors even though
NLRB had not acted); Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945) (state law setting
qualifications for union office conflicted with union members' rights under the NLRA to
choose bargaining representatives, and therefore was preempted); see also Salny, Jurisdictional Conflicts Under National and State Labor Relations Acts, 10 U. PITT. L. REv. 327
(1949) (discussing Bethlehem Steel); Note, Labor Law-State Statute Regulating Labor
Unions-Repugnancy to National Labor Relations Act, 94 U. PA. L. REv. 114 (1945) (discussing Hill); Note, State Regulation of Labor Unions, 55 YALE L.J. 440 (1946) (discussing
Hill). But see International Union, U.A.W., A.F of L., Local 232 v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd.
(Briggs & Stratton), 336 U.S. 245 (1949) (intermittent work stoppage short of strike neither
protected nor condemned by NLRA; state regulation therefore permissible); Getman, The
Protected Status of Partial Strikes After Lodge 76: A Comment, 29 STAN. L. REv. 205
(1977) (discussing case overruling Briggs & Stratton); Lopatka, The Unprotected Status of
PartialStrikes After Lodge 76: A Reply to Professor Getman, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1181 (1977)
(same); Note, supra note 27 (same).
55. See United Auto., Aircraft & Agr'l Implement Workers v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd.,
351 U.S. 266 (1956) (although violence is an unfair labor practice under the NLRA, the
states have concurrent authority to prevent violence); Allen-Bradley Local 1111, United
Elec., Radio & Machine Workers v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942) (state use
of police power to prevent union violence does not conflict with the NLRA).
56. See Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538, 556 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("[T]Ibs Court has been extremely cautious in upsetting State regulation unless it has
found that the regulation devised by Congress and that by which the State dealt with some
local concern cannot, in a practical world, coexist."); see also San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959) (noting exception for conduct that touches interests
"deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility"); infra note 77.
57. See mfra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
58. See Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1957).

1986]

LABOR PREEMPTION DOCTRINE

521

In cases that did not fit this narrow exception, the Court readily
invoked preemption. The Court especially was inclined to find preemption when federal labor law conflicted directly with state labor
laws. In these cases, the Court properly held that the state regulations were wholly preempted. 59 The Court also applied preemption
when state remedies paralleled potentially conflicting federal
remedies. 60
This analysis, which looked exclusively at whether the NLRA
regulated the conduct in question, constituted the "primary jurisdiction" wing of the labor preemption doctrine."1 Historically, this

59. See Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees, Div. 998 v.
Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd., 340 U.S. 383; 394 (1951) ("[W]here, as here, the state seeks to
deny entirely a federally guaranteed right which Congress itself restricted only to a limited
extent in case of national emergencies, however serious, it is manifest that the state legislation is in conflict with federal law.").
60. See Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485,
490-91, 498 (1953). In Garner,the Court held that the NLRA preempted state courts from
enjoining union recognitional picketing because such injunctions create the danger of conflict with federal labor policy: "For a state to impinge on the area of labor combat designed
to be free is quite as much an obstruction of federal policy as if the state were to declare
picketing free for purposes or by methods which the federal Act prohibits." Id. at 499-500.
61. The "primary jurisdiction" wing of the labor preemption doctrine suggests that the
NLRB has primary jurisdiction over any conduct actually or arguably regulated by the
NLRA. The strongest judicial statement of this doctrine came from Justice Jackson m Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953):
Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be enforced by
any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the parties. It went on to
confide primary interpretation and application of its rules to a specific and
specially constituted tribunal and prescribed a particular procedure for investigation, complaint and notice, and hearing and decision, including judicial relief
pending a final administrative order. Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive rules and to avoid these diversities
and conflicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes
toward labor controversies.
A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of
procedures are quite as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of substantive law. The same reasoning which prohibits federal courts from intervening in such cases, except by way of review or
an application of the federal Board, precludes state courts from doing so.
Id. at 490-91; see also Benke, supra note 30, at 809 ("[T]he primary jurisdiction rationale
clearly requires that when the same controversy can be presented to the state court or the
National Labor Relations Board, it should be brought before the Board."); Note, supra note
27, at 503 ("Garnerarticulated the concept that there is an area of labor combat intended to
be free of governmental regulation.").
Later, a second, "unregulable activity" wing of the labor preemption doctrine developed.
See tnfra note 138 and accompanying text.
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analysis was the foundation of the preemption doctrine in labor
law cases.6 2 Under this analysis, for example, state law remained
preempted even if the NLRB exercised its discretion to decline to
hear a particular case, creating a "no man's land" that left some
parties without an effective remedial forum. 63 In practical effect,
the primary jurisdiction scheme was virtually indistinguishable
from pure preemption.6 4
In applying the primary jurisdiction approach in early cases, the
Court identified a number of factors that were helpful in determining whether the NLRA regulated a particular area of conduct and
therefore preempted state regulation. In a variety of essentially
tort-based cases, for example, the Court refused to preempt an
analogous state remedy if the federal remedy was inadequate, and
thus was "non-parallel" and not potentially in conflict with the
state remedy 6 5 The Court also looked to whether the particular

62. See Benke, supra note 30; Shute, State Versus Federal Jurisdiction in Labor Disputes: The Garner Case, 19 Mo. L. REv. 119 (1954).
63. See Guss v. Utah Labor Rel. Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1957). In Guss, the Court held
that the NLRA preempted the state court from taking action against prohibited activity,
even though the NLRB exercised its discretion not to handle the case. Id. at 9-10. The "no
man's land" problem first arose in Guss, as one commentator noted:
If the pre-emption doctrine were pushed to its logical end, the businesses
affecting commerce, but not satisfying the Board's jurisdictional standards,
would be beyond state control. This would result in a "non-man's land" in
which anarchy would replace law. A majority of the courts dealing with the
problem could not believe that Congress had intended so drastic a result. The
Supreme Court thought otherwise and so expressed itself in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board.
Comment, Preemption in Labor Relations, 35 Tax. L. REv. 555, 560 (1957) (footnotes omitted); see Cohen, Congress Clears the Labor No Man's Land: A Long-Awaited Solution
Spawns a Host of New Problems, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 333 (1961); Gould, The Garmon Case:
Decline and Threshold of "LitigatingElucidation",39 U. DET. LJ. 539, 567 (1962); Kadish
& Degnan, Some Light on the Twilight Zone, 5 UTAH L REV. 336 (1957); McCoid, Notes on
a "G-String" A Study of the "No-Man's Land" of Labor Law, 44 MN. L. REv. 205 (1959);
Note, Does the NLRB Have the Power to Decline to Exercise Its Jurisdiction?, 26 GEo.
WASH. L. Rav. 446 (1958).

64. See Michelman, supra note 27, at 645.
65. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 621 (1958) (expelled union member could collect damages against the union under state contract law);
International Union, United Auto., Aircraft & Agr'l Implement Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S.
634, 645-46 (1958) (employee forcibly denied access to work by a picket line could recover
damages against the union under state law for medical expenses, pam and suffering, and
property damages because these items of recovery were beyond the scope of the NLRB
remedial order); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 665
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case involved an assertion of collective "public" rights, to which
the NLRA was pertinent, or an assertion of primarily individualized "private" rights, which the NLRA would not preempt.66
Because state courts generally are unsuited to make complex decisions concerning whether the NLRA protects or prohibits labor
conduct and thus preempts state regulation, 7 the Court determined that these decisions in the first instance should be left exclusively to the NLRB. es The Court correctly perceived that the
risk of discordant state decisions was too great.6 9 This perception,
which characterized the Court's early labor preemption cases,
culminated in 1959 in the landmark decision of San Diego Buildmg Trades Council v. Garmon.70
B. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon" is the classic
modern labor preemption case. 2 In Garmon, the Court
(1954) (damages under state tort law allowed for losses from violent union conduct even
though the union acts also constituted an "unfair labor practice" under the NLRA).
66. See, e.g., United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 665 (1954)
("The primarily private nature of claims for damages under state law also distinguishes
them in a measure from the public nature of the regulation of future labor relations under
federal law."). But cf. Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union No. 776, 346
U.S. 485, 500 (1953) ("Whatever purpose a classification of rights as public or private may
serve, it is too unsettled and ambiguous to introduce into constitutional law as a dividing
line between federal and state power or jurisdiction.").
67. See Hays, State Courts and Federal Preemption, 23 Mo. L. REv. 373, 376-82 (1958).
68. See Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485,
489 (1953) ("It is not necessary or appropriate for us to surmise how the National Labor
Relations Board might have decided this controversy.
The power and duty of primary
decision lies with the Board, not with us."); Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468,
478 (1955) ("IT]he Board, and not the state court, is empowered to pass upon such issues
[concerning § 8(b)(4)(D) unfair union labor practices] in the first instance.").
The primary jurisdiction of the NLRB also can preempt federal courts m favor of the
Board, although these occurrences are less frequent. See Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec.
Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 284 (1971); San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959).
69. According to one commentator, "The essential dilemma of preemption in the field of
concerted employee activities, then, is whether we are prepared to undertake the risk of
admitting improper state action for the sake of preserving desirable state action."
Michelman, supra note 27, at 683.
70. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
71. Id.
72. For thoughtful, thorough discussions of Garmon, see Gould, supra note 63;
Michelman, supra note 27; Shultz & Husband, Federal Preemption Under the NLRA. A
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promulgated broad rules of labor preemption in deciding that a
state court lacked jurisdiction to award tort damages to an employer under state law for loss of business caused by union picketing. The NLRB had exercised its discretion to decline jurisdiction
because the amount of business in interstate commerce did not
meet the Board's minimum jurisdictional standards.7 3 Despite the
Board's refusal to take the case, the Supreme Court held that state
court jurisdiction was preempted. 4
The importance of Garmon stems from the general rules that the
Court laid out to govern labor preemption:
When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities
which a State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor
practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield.
At times it has not been clear whether the particular activity
regulated by the States was governed by § 7 or § 8 or was, perhaps, outside both these sections. But courts are not primary
tribunals to adjudicate such issues. It is essential to the admmistration of the Act that these determinations be left in the first
instance to the National Labor Relations Board. What is outside
the scope of this Court's authority cannot remain within a
State's power and state jurisdiction too must yield to the exclusive primary competence of the Board.
When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the
Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the
exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if
the danger of state interference with national policy is to be
5
7

averted.

Under Garmon, if labor activity clearly is protected or clearly is
prohibited, preemption applies. More significantly, however, the

Rule tn Search of a Reason, 62 DEN. U.L. REv. 531 (1985); Note, supra note 27, at 499-501;
Comment, State Common Law Actions for Damages and the NLRA-The Problem of Federal Preemption, 26 Mo. L. REv. 250 (1961); Comment, supra note 25, at 141-47.
73. See 359 U.S. at 238.
74. Id. at 245-46.
75. Id. at 244-45 (citations omitted).
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Court in Garmon also extended preemption to conduct arguably
prohibited or protected.7 6
The decision represented a significant expansion of the labor
preemption doctrine, without an abrogation of the well-established
exceptions to the doctrine.7 The Court rejected a painstaking
case-by-case analysis,78 and instead recognized that the most efficacious judicial approach was one "confined to dealing with classes of
situations. '7 9 Rather than struggling with the "precise nature and

76. Professor Cox has been very critical of the "arguably protected" rule in Garman:
[T]o avoid the risk of a state court misinterpretation or nnsfinding, the "arguably protected" rule shuts the door to determination of the question, and thus
denies the hope of remedy for what might well turn out to be a substantive
wrong. In effect, it denies the employer a day in court.
Cox, Preemption Revisited, supra note 12, at 1363.
77. The Court recognized the local concerns exception, and the violence exception that it
incorporated, see supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text, reasoning that these matters
should be left to state regulation. According to the Court, such "conduct touched interests
so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that
[the Court] could not infer that
Congress had deprived the States of the power to act." 359 U.S. at 244. The Court also
recognized a "catch-all" exception for labor conduct of only "peripheral" concern to the
NLRA, which supplemented the local concerns exception: "[D]ue regard for the presuppositions of our embracing federal system
has required us not to find withdrawal from the
States of power to regulate where the activity regulated was a merely peripheral concern of
the Labor Management Relations Act." Id. at 243.
78. See 359 U.S. at 243. Professor Cox had advocated this broader judicial approach to
the labor preemption doctrine in his early influential article concerning labor preemption:
If the applicability of each state law is to be decided ad hoc by inquiring into
how seriously it will interfere with national policy, litigation will continue until
each little point is decided by the Supreme Court; meanwhile the litigants and
all persons similarly situated will be left to speculation. State judges have
shown extraordinary ingenuity in discovering grounds for applying state law in
fields apparently foreclosed by Supreme Court decisions.
Cox, Federalism, supra note 12, at 1317 (footnote omitted).
79. 359 U.S. at 242. Justice Frankfurter noted that this approach freed the courts from
discordant, isolated case-by-case decisioniaking, and left precise refinements for particular
cases to Congress and the NLRB, which were more capable of making those refinements:
Our task is confined to dealing with classes of situations. To the National Labor Relations Board and to Congress must be left those precise and closely
limited demarcations that can be adequately fashioned only by legislation and
administration. We have necessarily been concerned with potential conflict of
two law-enforcing authorities, with the disharmomes inherent in two systems,
one federal and the other state, of inconsistent standards of substantive law
and differing remedial schemes. But the unifying consideration of our decisions
has been regard to the fact that Congress has entrusted administration of the
labor policy for the Nation to a centralized administrative agency, armed with
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degree of federal-state conflict,""0 the Court focused on identifying
general areas of federal-state conflict "in its broadest sense.""' The
result was a sweeping preemption doctrine that vested the NLRB
with exclusive jurisdiction to decide the full panoply of labor activ82
ities either clearly or arguably prohibited or protected by the Act.
Absent one of the historically recognized exceptions, the rule enunciated in Garmon created a strong presumption in favor of preemption, which extended even to legitimate state action. 83
Garmon is the classic example of the primary jurisdiction rationale for NLRB authority 4 According to this rationale, the NLRB
should determine whether particular conduct is prohibited, protected, or unregulated. According to the Court, Congress "entrusted administration of the labor policy for the Nation to a centralized administrative agency
equipped with its specialized
knowledge and cumulative experience."8 5
Garmon had many virtues. The rule in Garmon was easy to apply, and it provided a workable bright-line test that generally was
its own procedures, and equipped with its specialized knowledge and cumulative experience.
Id. These classic principles, which favor a general, broad labor preemption rule to a case-bycase approach, stand in stark contrast to the badly fragmented, ad hoc approach of the
Burger Court. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 1916 (1985) ("The full
scope of the pre-emptive effect of federal labor-contract law remains to be fleshed out on a
case-by-case basis.").
80. 359 U.S. at 242.
81. Id. at 243.
82. The Court noted: "[T]o allow the States to control activities that are potentially subject to federal regulation involves too great a danger of conflict with national labor policy."
Id. at 246.
83. According to the Court:
Even the States' salutary effort to redress private wrongs or grant compensation for past harm cannot be exerted to regulate activities that are potentially
subject to the exclusive federal regulatory scheme. It may be that an award of
damages in a particular situation will not, in fact, conflict with the active assertion of federal authority. The same may be true of the incidence of a particular
state injunction. To sanction either involves a conflict with federal policy in
that it involves allowing two law-making sources to govern.
Id. at 247.
In his concurring opinion in Garmon, Justice Harlan expressed reservations about the
sweeping scope of the majority's holding. He especially feared that, in cases in which the
Board declined to exercise jurisdiction, states would be precluded permanently from rectifying violations of local law. Id. at 253 (Harlan, J., concurring).
84. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
85. 359 U.S. at 242.
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fair. The rule promoted uniformity, policy integration, stability,
and consistency. Under Garmon, inexpert or hostile state courts
could not impair employees' federally protected rights. With a few
refinements, the doctrine would be far preferable to a babel of contradictory decisions rendered by fifty states on critical labor issues,
even if the refined doctrine ran some risk of becoming a rigid, absolutist preemption doctrine. 6
Unfortunately, the Court since 1959, for the most part, has
eroded Garmon seriously. The litany of exceptions to Garmon, in
areas wholly removed from the well-established violence and local
concerns exceptions, threatens to swallow the doctrine, and has
compromised the practicality of its application.8 7 As a result, the
rule in Garmon "can now be described only by reference to its
exceptions."""
A labor policy grounded on a rule riddled with exceptions is
worthless.8 9 Without a coherent national labor policy, labor statutes provide no more than spasmodic partial protection. This pernicious negative synergy robs labor law theory of vitality. The following sections first describe the judicial erosion of the labor
preemption doctrine since Garmon, and then examine the promise
in recent decisions of a return to a coherent labor policy through
the long overdue renaissance of the doctrine.
IV SIGNIFICANT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS IN THE 1960's AND
1970's: THE DEMISE OF A COHERENT LABOR PREEMPTION DOCTRINE

A. Initial Applications of Garmon by the Warren Court
Only four years after Garmon, the Supreme Court began its retreat from the labor preemption doctrine in a decision that simultaneously dealt a disastrous blow to organized labor. In Retail
90
Clerks International Association, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn,

86. Bryson, A Matter of Wooden Logic: Labor Law Preemption and Individual Rights,
51 Tm L. REv. 1037, 1058 (1973).
87. See Recent Development, Labor Law-Preemption-StateCourt May Exercise Jurisdiction to Restrain Peaceful Union Trespass Both Arguably Protected and Arguably
Prohibitedby NationalLabor Relations Act, 64 ComRNLL. REv. 595, 608 (1979).
88. Bryson, supra note 86, at 1041.
89. See Hooton, supra note 49, at 64.
90. 375 U.S. 96 (1963).
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nonunion employees had sued in state court to enjoin an "agency
shop" clause that violated a state right-to-work law The state
court had granted the injunction, and the union had appealed.9 1
The United States Supreme Court upheld the injunction, holding
that the NLRA did not preempt the state court's authority to issue
it.92
The Court rejected the union's contention that the NLRB had
exclusive jurisdiction to enforce state right-to-work laws. Noting
that section 14(b) of the NLRA permitted states to pass right-towork legislation,"3 the Court recognized the anomaly that would result from holding that the NLRA preempted state courts from enforcing right-to-work laws through injunctive relief.9 4 The Court
found Garmon neither dispositive nor even persuasive because it
"[did] not state a constitutional principle; it merely rationalize[d]
the problems of coexistence between federal and state regulatory
'
schemes."95
The Supreme Court established another major exception to Garmon in Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114.96 In Linn,
the plaintiff sued the union for distributing allegedly defamatory
leaflets during an organizational campaign. The Court held that
the NLRB did not have exclusive jurisdiction over the matter, and
that the NLRA did not preempt the state court from awarding
damages for defamation under state law. Recognizing the unique

91. See id. at 98.

92. Id. at 105.
93. See id. at 99. Section 14(b) provides: "Nothing in [the Act] shall be construed as
authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor orgamzation as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution
or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law." 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1982).
94. The Court stated, "[I]t
would be odd to construe § 14(b) as permitting a State to
prohibit the agency clause by barring it from implementing its own law with sanctions of the
kind involved here." 375 U.S. at 99.
95. Id. at 103.
96. 383 U.S. 53 (1966). For more complete commentary concerning Linn, see Come, Since
Garmon, supra note 49; Currier, Defamation in Labor Disputes:Preemption and the New
Federal Common Law, 53 VA. L. REV. 1 (1967); Note, Labor Law: The "Compelling State
Interest" Exception to the Federal PreemptionDoctrine, 51 MARQ.L. REv. 89 (1967); Note,
Libel in Labor Disputes-FederalVersus State Jurisdiction,20 Sw. L.J. 884 (1966); Comment, supra note 25, at 149-54.
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dynamics of labor law, however, the Court held that the plaintiff
had to prove both malice and injury to prevail.97
The Court in Linn recognized that section 7 of the NLRA at
least arguably protected statements not involving malice and injury, and that the conduct surrounding such statements fell within
the exclusive jurisdiction conferred upon the NLRB under the rule
in Garmon.95 The Court refused to find total preemption, however,
because in its view defamation was within both the peripheral concern exception and the local interest exception to Garmon.99 By
interpreting these exceptions so broadly, the Court in Linn significantly compromised the NLRB's primary jurisdiction.
In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court ruled that the NLRA
also did not preempt a suit for breach of a union's duty of fair
representation, even though the NLRB had characterized such
breaches as unfair labor practices. 10 In Vaca v. Sipes,101 the Court
97. The Court held:
In order that the recognition of legitimate state interests does not interfere
with effective administration of national labor policy
[we] limit the availability of state remedies for libel to those instances in which the complainant
can show that the defamatory statements were circulated with malice and
caused him damage.
The standards enunciated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
are
adopted by analogy, rather than under constitutional compulsion. We apply
the malice test to effectuate the statutory design with respect to pre-emption.
383 U.S. at 64-65.
98. Id. at 60-61.
99. Id. at 61.
100. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d
Cir. 1963). Under the doctrine of MirandaFuel, a discharged employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement with a provision forbidding discharge except for "just cause" can
bring an action not only against the employer, but also against the union. According to the
doctrine, the union's failure to enforce the employee's rights under the collective bargaining
agreement can constitute a breach of the union's duty of fair representation. Id. at 185-86
(holding that such a failure violated § 8(b) of the NLRA, as well as other provisions); see
also Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, ch. 20, § 301, 61 Stat. 150,
156 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982)) (authorizing suits for breaches of labor contracts).
Although the Second Circuit had refused enforcement in Miranda Fuel, 326 F.2d 172 (2d
Cir. 1963), the existence of a statutory duty of fair representation had been recognized in a
number of court decisions following Miranda Fuel and preceeding Vaca v. Sipes. See, e.g.,
Local Union No. 12, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d
12 (5th Cir. 1966), enforcing 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964).
For comprehensive explanations of the dynamics of a hybrid lawsuit for breach of the
duty of fair representation, and for unjust discharge, under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, see Gregory, A Call for Supreme Court Clarificationof the Union
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rejected the argument that, because the union breach was an unfair labor practice, preemption should apply and the NLRB should
have exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. 102
Vaca is significant because it signaled increasing judicial reliance
on a balancing approach, rather than a pure primary jurisdiction
approach, in labor preemption cases. The Court in Vaca intimated
that, in labor preemption cases, it would look both to the nature of
the particular interests involved and to the impact on national labor policy 103 The Court proceeded to apply these factors, reasoning that the duty of fair representation was intended to protect
"individuals stripped of traditional forms of redress by the provisions of federal labor law" 104 and that the individual interests at
stake were unique and were not recognized fully by the NLRB.105
The Court also reasoned that a dispute between individual union
members and the union only peripherally implicates federal labor
policy.10 8 These complex interrelated factors, rather than the
Duty of Fair Representation, 29 ST. Louis U.L.J. 45 (1984); Gregory, Union Liability for
Damages After Bowen v. Postal Service: The Incongruity Between Labor Law and Title
VII Jurisprudence,35 BAYLOR L. Rav. 237 (1983).
101. 386 U.S. 171 (1967). For thorough commentary on Vaca, see Note, Labor
Law-FederalPreemption-NLRA Does Not Preempt Court Jurisdictionof Suit Against
Union for Breach of Its Duty of Fair Representation,13 WAYNE L. REv. 602 (1967); Comment, The Implications of Vaca v. Sipes on Employee Grievance Processing,17 BUFFALO L.
Rxv. 165 (1967); Comment, Union's Duty to Fairly Represent Its Members in Contract
Grievance Procedures-TheImpact of Vaca v. Sipes, 19 SYRACUSE L. REV. 66 (1967); Comment, Protectionof Individual Rights in Collective Bargaining: The Need for a More Definitive Standard of FairRepresentation Within the Vaca Doctrine, 14 ViLL. L. REv. 484
(1969); Comment, Individual Control over Personal Grievances Under Vaca v. Sipes, 77
YALE L.J. 559 (1968).
102. See 386 U.S. at 176-88.
103. The Court stated:
While these exceptions m no way undermine the vitality of the pre-emption
rule where applicable, they demonstrate that the decision to pre-empt federal
and state court jurisdiction over a given class of cases must depend upon the
nature of the particular interests being asserted and the effect upon the admmistration of national labor policies of concurrent judicial and administrative
remedies.
Id. at 180.
104. Id. at 182.
105. Id. at 181-83.
106. Id. at 180; see Cox, supra note 44, at 284.
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simple Garmon rules, were crucial to the Court's decision not to
find preemption. "
B. FurtherErosion of the Labor Preemption Doctrine by the Burger Court in the 1970's
During the tenure of the Burger Court, many interesting and important labor preemption cases were decided. Through these decisions, the Burger Court was primarily responsible for severely
debilitating the labor preemption doctrine. Ironically, however,
some decisions in the early 1980's placed the Court in the best position to resuscitate the doctrine. In 1986, the Court signaled that
the renaissance finally may have begun. The open question, however, is whether the restored doctrine will be sustained and nurtured, or precipitously repudiated, by the Rehnquist Court.
The Burger Court's approach to labor preemption cases was consistent with its general tendency to vest greater authority in the
states. 0 8 Unless Congress clearly evidenced an intent that the federal government should occupy a particular field, the Burger Court
generally refused to presume "that a federal statute was intended
to supersede the exercise of the power of the state."' 0 9 According
to the Court, "The exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly to
be presumed.""l 0 Consistent with this tendency, the Burger Court
usually found against preemption of state court jurisdiction in its
labor preemption decisions, with only a few significant
exceptions."'

107. The Court also grounded its refusal to find preemption on the concurrent state and
federal jurisdiction that section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act provides for
suits alleging violations of collective bargaining agreements. See id. at 183-88.
108. See supra note 10.
109. New York State Dep't of Social Serv. v. Dublino, 414 U.S. 405, 413 (1973) (quoting
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952)).
110. Id.
111. The Court has found in favor of preemption in only a handful of labor preemption
decisions in the quarter century since Garmon. See International Longshoremen's Ass'n v.
Davis, 106 S. Ct. 1904 (1986); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 106 S. Ct.
1395 (1986); Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 106 S. Ct.
1057 (1986); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 105 S. Ct. 1904 (1985); Local 926, Int'l Union of
Operating Eng'rs v. Jones, 460 U.S. 669 (1983); Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976); Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. &
Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
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This erosion of Garmon left the labor preemption doctrine without a coordinated theoretical foundation. Until 1986, the Court reacted to individual cases, paying little regard to broad principles.
As one commentator put it, the Court's decisions "t[ook] on an ad
hoc unprincipled quality, seemingly bereft of any consistent doctrinal basis. 112 For most of its tenure, the Burger Court endorsed
this ad hoc approach to labor preemption, 11 3 which commentators
feared would "presage a [continuing] return to a state-directed
preemption doctrine. 1 11 4 Fortunately, however, the Burger Court's
labor preemption decisions "cannot be viewed as a doctrinal monolith, 11 1 5 because they lacked a principled basis and, just as importantly, because the Burger Court eventually seemed to return to
broad labor preemption principles.
The Burger Court's labor preemption jurisprudence probably
should be bifurcated. During the 1970's, the. states' rights jurisprudence of the Burger Court was at its zenith, and the labor preemption doctine underwent a steady erosion. During the 1980's, on the
other hand, the doctrine went through a confused interim transition period, which culminated with the unexpected, but very welcome, apparent renaissance of the doctrine in 1986. This section
chronicles the erosion of the doctrine during the first of these two
periods.
The Burger Court first confronted the labor preemption doctrine
directly in Amalgamated Associatin of Street, Electric Railway &
Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge. 6 In that case, a union had
suspended Wilson Lockridge for failing to pay dues for the prior
month. Invoking the union security clause in the collective bargaining agreement, the union had prevailed on the employer to discharge Lockridge. Lockridge then had sued the union in state
court, alleging that the union constitution provided only for suspension in delinquent dues cases, and not for discharge." 7 The

112. Note, Shifting Perspectives, supra note 10, at 624.
113. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 1916 (1985).
114. Note, Shifting Perspectives, supra note 10, at 624.
115. Id. at 651.
116. 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
117. Id. at 277-82.
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Court held that the state court was preempted from hearing the
118
case.
The Court's finding of preemption, which amounted to a reaffirmation of Garmon, was termed by one commentator "a climax m
the dominance of the federally protective approach." 1 9 Nonetheless, some justices in Lockrzdge already were expressing dissatisfaction with the broad preemption rules of Garmon. Justice White,
for example, pointedly stated that the labor preemption "'rule' of
uniformity
is at best a tattered one, and at worst little more
than a myth."' 2 0 Justice Harlan's majority opinion, however, reemphasized the need for broad general preemption rules. After serious reflection on the problems posed by labor preemption, Justice
Harlan concluded that broad rules would eliminate the need for
case-by-case analysis, and would remain consistent with the

118. See id. at 293. See generally Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72 COLUM. L. Rav. 469 (1972) (discussing Lockridge).
Before Lockridge, the Court's stance concerning the issue had wavered. Compare International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958) (union member's wrongful expulsion suit against union in state court, seeking reinstatement and lost wages, not preempted
by NLRA § 8(b)(2) because state court action was based on contract between the individual
and the union) with Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963)
(union member's suit against union in state court, seeking damages for discrimination in job
referrals, was preempted) and Local No. 207, Int'l As'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental
Iron Workers Union v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963) (union member's suit against union in
state court, seeking damages for discharge, was preempted). In both Borden and Perko, the
Court had invoked the broad preemption principles in Garmon. See Borden, 373 U.S. at
693-94; Perko, 373 U.S. at 706. The Court had distinguished Gonzales in those cases because
Gonzales had involved solely internal union matters and not conduct arguably protected or
prohibited by sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA. Borden, 373 U.S. at 696-97; Perko, 373 U.S. at
705.
119. Note, Shifting Perspectives, supra note 10, at 652. The need for federal dominance
in Lockridge, in the form of exclusive NLRB jurisdiction to determine whether a union
acted illegally in procuring a discharge for failure to pay dues, seems questionable and incongruous with the preemptive NLRB setting. As a result, Professor Cox deemed Lockndge
"woodenly mechancial-detached from any rational basis in policy and mconsistent with
related precedents." Cox, Preemption Revisited, supra note 12, at 1374.
120. 403 U.S. at 318 (White, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger and Justices Douglas
and Blackmun also dissented.
Many commentators expressed their dissatisfaction even more pointedly. One commentator, for example, maintained: "The time has long since come to eschew entirely the traditional 'primary jurisdiction' rationale implicit in the 'protected or prohibited' aphorim
which has served as the guiding wisdom in the area.
Virtually every aspect of this rubric is analytically disquieting, doctrinally misleading, or both." Lesnick, supra note 118, at
472.
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emphasis in Garmon on resolving entire classes of cases.'2 1 According to Justice Harlan, judicial adherence to Garmon was
imperative:
While we do not assert that the Garmon doctrine is without imperfection, we do think that it is founded on reasoned principle
and that until it is altered by congressional action or by judicial
insights that are born of further experience with it, a heavy burden rests upon those who would, at this late date, ask this Court
to abandon Garmon and set out again in quest of a system more
nearly perfect. A fair regard for considerations of stare decists
and the coordinate role of the Congress in defining the extent to
which federal legislation pre-empts state law strongly support
our conclusion that the basic tenets of Garmon should not be
disturbed. 2 '
Six months after authoring the majority opinion in Lockridge,
Justice Harlan died. Not long after his death, the Court apparently
forgot Justice Harlan's cautions. With few exceptions, the Burger
Court during the next decade methodically dismantled the labor
preemption doctrine. In NLRB v. Boeing Co., 12 3 decided two years
after Lockridge, the Court held that the NLRB had no authority
to review the reasonableness of union disciplinary fines because
those issues involved purely internal union affairs."2 4 Although
Boeing was not strictly a labor preemption case, it did have preemption implications because the Court deemed the matter an issue for state courts and not for the NLRB. 2 5 Boeing was patently
irreconcilable with the general preemption approach of Lockridge
and Garmon. This setback, however, represented only the first of
the many major blows that the Burger Court would deliver to the
Garmon doctrine.
The Court's next significant labor preemption decision, Lodge
76, International Association of Machinists v. Wisconsin

121. 403 U.S. at 289-90.
122. Id. at 302.
123. 412 U.S. 67 (1973). For interesting commentary on Boeing, see Craver, The Boeing
Decision: A Blow to Federalism,IndividualRights and Stare Dectsis, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 556
(1974).
124. See id. at 74, 78.
125. See id. at 75-77.
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Employment Relations Commission,128 represented a rare, isolated
adherence to the Garmon rule 12 7 rather than an extension of the
misgivings about labor preemption expressed in Boeing and in the
dissents to Lockridge. In Machinists, the Court considered
whether the NLRA preempted state sanctions against a union that
had directed its members not to work any overtime. The refusal to
work overtime was the union's tactical response to a unilateral announcement by the employer of new workday, workweek, and overtine provisions when negotiations toward a new collective bargainIng agreement had reached an impasse concerning these issues.
Rather than disciplining employees who refused to work overtime,
the employer had filed an unfair labor practice charge with the
NLRB and a complaint with the Wisconsin Employment Relations
Commission. The regional director of the NLRB had dismissed the
unfair labor practice charge, but the state commission had decided
that the overtime ban was an unfair labor practice under state law
and had ordered the union to cease and desist. 128 The commission
had concluded that the NLRA did not preempt an order based on
state law because the NLRA neither arguably protected nor arguably prohibited the union's conduct. 129 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals and the Wisconsin Supreme Court both had affirmed the
commission's order.13 0
The United States Supreme Court reversed the commission and
the state courts, holding that state regulation was preempted

126. 427 U.S. 132 (1976). For complete discussions of Machinists,see Getman, supra note

54; Note, State Regulation of Peaceful Self-Help Conduct Is Pre-empted by National Labor Policy-Lodge 76, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 26 DEPAuL L. REv. 696 (1977).
127. Including Lockridge, the Court has decided only seven cases in which it has upheld
the rules rs Garmon and has found that state action was preempted. See supra note 111.
128. See 427 U.S. at 133-36. The commission had concluded that the union had violated
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.06(2) (West 1974), which provided:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employee individually or in concert

with others:
To take unauthorized possession of property of the employer or to engage in
any concerted effort to interfere with production except by leaving the premises in an orderly manner for the purpose of going on strike.

Id.
129. See 427 U.S. at 135.
130. See id. at 136 (citing 67 Wis. 2d 13, 226 N.W.2d 203 (1975)).
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because it would frustrate Congress' intent to leave activities
neither protected nor prohibited by the NLRA to the free forces of
the market.1 3 ' The Court relied on Congress' perceived intent to
leave federally unregulated union conduct, such as partial strikes
or overtime refusals, to a free market balance "'between the uncontrolled power of management and labor to further their respective interests.' "132 According to the Court, "the crucial inquiry regarding pre-emption
is whether 'the exercise of plenary state
authority to curtail or entirely prohibit self-help would frustrate
effective implementation of the Act's processes.' "'" The Court did
not apply the primary jurisdiction approach of Garmon, even
though that approach could have resolved the question, because it
viewed that analysis
as "largely inapplicable to the circumstances
13 4
case.
th[e]
of
The Court did not address explicitly whether the union overtime
refusal arguably was prohibited as a section 8(b)(3) unfair labor
practice. The force of the Court's reasoning, however, implies that
not only the state court but also the NLRB should refrain from
interfering with such partial strike activity In effect, the Court in
Machinists based its decision that the state court was preempted
on the premise that "the activity [was] unregulable because Congress meant to leave it to the free play of the opposing economic
forces."' 5 The same premise would apply to attempted NLRB regulation.'
As a result, the Court recognized a limbo-like laissez
37
faire state of labor conduct that was "entirely unregulable.'
Although the "unregulable activity" principle of Machinists
eventually became the second major wing of the labor preemption
doctrine,13 it never enjoyed a broad application. Subsequent to

131. Id. at 155.
132. Id. at 146 (quoting Local 20, Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Union v. Morton, 377
U.S. 252, 259 (1964)).
133. Id. at 147-48 (quoting Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co.,
394 U.S. 369, 380 (1969)).
134. Id. at 155.
135. See Lopatka, supra note 54, at 1182.
136. The Court, in fact, stated that "Congress meant that these activities, whether of
employer or employees, were not to be regulable by states any more than by the NLRB."
Machinists, 427 U.S. at 149.
137. See Lopatka, supra note 54, at 1183.
138. See infra notes 381-85 and accompanying text.
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Machinists, the Court classified few activities in the unregulable
free market category. Most labor preemption cases continued to
arise under the Garmon "primary jurisdiction" wing of the labor
preemption doctrine. Regardless of which doctrinal wing the Burger Court applied, it continued its steady attack on the doctrine as
a whole, continuing its strong predisposition against preemption.
The next significant labor preemption decision was Farmer v.
United Brotherhood of Carpenters.3 9 In that case, the Court offered a new balancing test, finding that the NLRA did not preempt
state court jurisdiction in a suit by a carpenter against his union
under state law seeking damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 14 0 The Court's balancing test, which was analogous
to the well-established local concerns exception to the preemption
doctrine,'4 involved an examination of both "the state interests m
regulating the conduct in question and the potential for interference with the federal regulatory scheme.

' 142

Under this formula,

the Court had no trouble concluding that, in the type of suit it was
considering, the "potential for interference is insufficient to counterbalance the legitimate and substantial interest of the State m
protecting its citizens. 143
Significantly, the Court in Farmer avoided any serious discussion of whether the NLRA "arguably" protected or prohibited the
union's conduct. Instead, in a more contextually fluid analysis, the
Court articulated a new congeries of considerations in labor preemption determinations. The Court indicated that it would look
first to whether the NLRA protects the conduct under

139. 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
140. Id. at 292-95. The NLRA may preempt suits against employers under state law seeking damages for alleged bad faith breaches of contract when the plaintiff fails to pursue his
labor contract remedies. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 1916 (1985)
(finding preemption "when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon
analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract"). The
stubborn ad hoc quality of the Court's decision in Lueck, however, enables continuing state
law exceptions from federal labor preemption. See, e.g., Heckler v. IBEW, 772 F.2d 788
(11th Cir. 1985) (union member allowed to bring state tort law suit against umon, claiming a
negligent failure to ensure that plaintiff had safety training adequate to prevent injury),
cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1967 (1986). The Court's ruling in Lueck eventually may dampen
the state tort law suits against unions endorsed in Farmer.
141. See supra note 77.
142. 430 U.S. at 297.
143. Id. at 304.
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consideration,14 4 but that it also would look to arguably more important factors such as whether a state decision would present a
significant risk of fundamentally compromising congressional in46
tent

45

and whether the activity was an inherently local concern.

This panoply of manipulable variables rarely would point toward
preemption, because the possibility of state interference with national labor policy purportedly is not great.
The formula in Farmer dictated a return to paintaking case-bycase analysis rather than the analysis of broad classes of situations
dictated m Garmon.147 One commentator noted: "After Farmer,
the ability to merely discuss or argue applicability of federal law is
no longer sufficient to invoke preemption. There must be a 'realistic argument' that federal law applies."'148 As a result, Farmer reduced Garmon to a mere starting point for labor preemption questions. 14 9 Although Farmer initially appeared consonant with

Garmon, 50 it ultimately proved to be a judicial device to reject
labor preemption. Farmerhastened the devolution toward atomistic and fitful case law.
One year later, m Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County
District Council of Carpenters,'5 ' the Court continued its attack
144. See id. at 302.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 296-97.
147. See Benke, supra note 30, at 804; see also supra note 79 and accompanying text
(noting broader Garmon approach).
148. Benke, supra note 30, at 804.
149. See id. at 807.
150. See Note, The Preemption Doctrine:New York Balks, 29 SYRACUSE L. REV. 739, 743

(1978).
151. 436 U.S. 180 (1978). Sears has been the subject of much commentary. See, e.g.,
Brody, supra note 45; Note, Accomodating Nonemployees: NLRA Protectionof Concerted

Union Conduct in the Wake of Sears, 29 CATH.U.L. REV. 185 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Accommodating Nonemployees]; Note, The Role of State Courts in Labor-Related
Access Disputes, 57 Tax. L. REv. 131 (1979); Note, Union Trespass: Sears v. Carpenters and
Labor Law Preemption, 40 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 779 (1979); Comment, Union Pickets at the
Shopping Center: Protected Conduct or Actionable Trespass Under Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. San Diego County District Council of Carpenters, 32 BAYLOR L. REV.91 (1980); Comment,
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of Carpenters: The Demise of
Federal Preemption of Labor Disputes, 16 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 921 (1979); Comment, Labor
Law PreemptionAfter Sears-Problems in Concurrent Jurisdiction-Wiggins& Co. v. Retail Clerks Local 1557, 47 TENN. L. REV. 373 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Concurrent Jurisdiction];Comment, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of
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on preemption. In Sears, the Court held that the California state
courts had jurisdiction to enforce state trespass laws against nonemployee union picketers. 1 52 Significantly, the picketing in Sears
arguably was protected by the NLRA, 153 which, under the primary
jurisdiction approach of Garmon, would have mandated preemption.15 4 The Court, however, termed the primary jurisdiction rationale "relative[ly] unimportan[t] in this context," ' and instead
looked to other factors. Noting, among other things, that the union
had not filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB and
that the employer could not have brought the matter directly
before the Board,1 56 the Court in Sears found that the state court
was not preempted from issumg injunctive relief. As a result, the
Court for the first time granted a state court jurisdiction
over con157
duct that arguably was protected by federal labor law.
Carpenters: Garmon Reconsidered and the Reaffirmation of PropertyRights, 13 U. Ric. L.
REv. 351 (1979).

For general discussions of the picketing/preemption problem, see Benke, supra note 30;
Broomfield, Preemptive FederalJurisdictionover Trespassory Union Activity, 83 HARv. L.
REv. 552 (1970); Modjeska, The Supreme Court and the Diversificationof National Labor
Policy, 12 U.C.D. L. REv. 37 (1979).
152. 436 U.S. at 207. Before Sears, the Court had not resolved whether the NLRA preempted state courts from deciding peaceful trepass and union picketing issues. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen, Local 427 v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20
(1957); Taggart v. Weinacker's, Inc., 283 Ala. 171, 214 So.2d 913 (1968), cert. granted, 396
U.S. 813 (1969), cert. dismissed per curiam, 397 U.S. 223 (1970). State courts were divided
concerning whether they had jurisdiction m these cases. See Note, State Court Jurisdiction
over Trespassory Union Picketing: Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District
Council of Carpenters, 20 B.C.L. REv. 558 (1979) (discussing state court cases).
153. See 436 U.S. at 199. The NLRA also arguably may have prohibited the union's
trespassory picketing if the union's purpose was to force Sears to assign carpentry work only
to carpenters from the union hiring hall, see 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(D) (1982), or if the picketing was "recognitional," see id. § 158(b)(7)(C).
154. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
155. 436 U.S. at 200.
156. See id. at 201-02.
157. The Court's decision to allow state court jurisdiction over arguably protected activity
was especially significant because of the Court's express statement that federal supremacy is
a greater consideration in cases of protected labor activity than m cases of prohibited labor
activity:
Apart from notions of "primary jurisdiction," there would be no objection to
state courts' and the NLRB's exercising concurrent jurisdiction over conduct
prohibited by the federal Act. But there is a constitutional objection to statecourt interference with conduct actually protected by the Act. Considerations
of federal supremacy, therefore, are implicated to a greater extent when laborrelated activity is protected than when it is prohibited.
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One commentator stated that the Court in Sears created "a new
balancing approach to preemption under which it will weigh both
the employer's and the state's interest in state court jurisdiction
against the potential interference with national labor policy in order to determine whether a state court may assert jurisdiction over
some aspect of a labor dispute.

'15

This "balancing approach" cer-

tamly has supplemented, if not supplanted, the Garmon analysis.
In fact, the Court in Sears virtually ignored Garmon.159
The Court's balancing analysis in Sears focused on the risk of
state interference with the NLRB. This risk was minimal, accordIng to the Court, because of the substantive differences between
the concerns of the state court and the NLRB. While the Board
was concerned with the purpose of the picketing, according to the
Court in Sears, the state court was concerned with the fact that
the picketing occurred on the employer's private property 180 The
Court concluded, based on this difference, that "permitting the
state court to adjudicate Sears' trespass claim would create no
realistic risk of interference with the Board's primary jurisdiction
Id. at 199-200 (footnotes omitted).
The concurring opinion of three justices in International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local
1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195 (1970), had augured this result. In Aradne
Shipping, the union had picketed foreign Caribbean crise vessels that used Florida ports,
because these vessels employed nonunion labor. The Florida state courts had enjoined the
picketing, holding that state action was not preempted because the union's conduct was
beyond the regulatory power of the NLRB. See id. at 196-98. Applying Garmon, the Supreme Court found that the union picketing arguably was protected by section 7, and therefore that the state court's jurisdiction was preempted. Id. at 200-01. Justice White's concurring opinion, however, candidly called for a relaxation of the strictures of Garmon:
So long as employers are effectively denied determinations by the NLRB as
to whether "arguably protected" picketing is actually protected except when
an employer is willing to threaten or use force to deal with picketing, I would
hold that only labor activity determined to be actually, rather than arguably,
protected under federal law should be immune from state judicial control. To
this extent
[Garmon] should be reconsidered.
397 U.S. at 202 (White, J., concurring) (citation omitted); see also Benke, supra note 30, at
799 ("For the first time, members of the United States Supreme Court called for a reconsideration of the Garmon preemption doctrine and suggested that state power should be preempted only if the activity complained of was actually protected.").
158. Note, supra note 152, at 560.
159. See supra note 155 and accompanying text; Note, Labor Law-Federal Preempton-The Aftermath of Sears, 27 WAYNE L. REv. 313, 333 (1980); infra note 161.
160. 436 U.S. at 198.
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to enforce the statutory prohibition against unfair labor
' 16 1
practices.
The Court also applied a balancing analysis to the quandry that
the employer would have faced if a state forum had been denied.
The Court noted that unless Sears was willing to commit an independent unfair labor practice, it would have been unable to secure
direct review of the union's conduct by the NLRB.16 2 If Sears
could not secure review by the NLRB because of these problems,
preemption of the state jurisdiction would totally deny Sears a forum.163 On the other hand, the Court held that review by a state
161. Id., see also Note, supra note 152, at 566 ("[U]nder the Court's new balancing approach, federal labor law did not preempt the California court's jurisdiction over Sears' trespass action [because t]he arguably prohibited nature of the union's conduct alone was 'insufficient to preclude a State from exercising jurisdiction limited to the trespassory aspects'
of the union's picketing." (quoting Sears, 436 U.S. at 198)).
Two years after Sears, one commentator astutely pointed out the weaknesses of the
Court's balancing approach:
The most unsettling aspect of Sears is that it impedes the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court plucked certain conduct from the Board's exclusive jurisdiction and placed it within the grasp of the state courts, State
courts now may decide whether an activity is actually or arguably protected. If
the conduct is actually protected, then the state court may not decide the case;
it must defer to the Board's jurisdiction. If the conduct is arguably protected,
then the state court proceeds with the two-prong test. Since Sears did not establish explicit standards for determining whether conduct was actually or arguably protected, the classification of conduct depends on the interpretation of
the particular state court. This seems to foster inconsistent interpretations of
labor disputes, and is in sharp opposition to the policy of entrusting the administration of the NLRA to a centralized agency.
Note, supra note 159, at 333.
162. See 436 U.S. at 201. Even if Sears was willing to go to such lengths, it still could not
have obtained direct review by the NLRB unless it could have proved that the union's picketing actually was prohibited by section 8 of the NLRB, and not just that it was not protected by section 7. See Brody, supra note 45, at 208 & n.9.
163. See 436 U.S. at 202. One commentator succinctly described the problems associated
with denial of a state forum:
If state action in all forms is precluded, a determination as to whether the
nonemployee activity is protected must await a decision by the National Labor
Relations Board. Since it would be difficult to conclude at the outset that an
unfair labor practice is involved, the employer might conclude he could not
bring the matter before the Board. Even if the employer brings such action, he
still must wait for the Board's decision. While he might resort to self-help to
oust the union organizers, thus perhaps prompting the union to seek a determination from the Board, he would clearly do so at his own peril. If it were to
develop that the activity was indeed protected, the employer would be subject
to an unfair labor practice charge. In any event, whether the activity is
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forum would present little risk because the state court probably
would not misinterpret federal law and restrain protected union
conduct.164 The Court concluded that this low risk justified its decision that state jurisdiction was not preempted despite the arguably protected nature of the union's conduct. 16 5
Three justices dissented in Sears, issuing perceptive warnings
about the serious dangers that the majority opinion posed for a
functioning labor jurisprudence. The dissenters noted the tangible
risk that state courts could misinterpret the NLRA, prohibiting
protected activity and protecting prohibited activity in diametric
opposition to Congress' intent that labor policy be uniform. 6 6
Even if a state court properly interpreted federal labor law, the
dissenters noted, the state court might provide remedies that tran67
scend the scope of equitable relief available under the Act.1 Most
ominously, according to the dissenters, the attitudes of many state
courts toward organized labor, and these courts' relative lack of

protected or not, such action is frought with potential violence. The most that
can be hoped for is that the organizers will take the dispute to the Board. Even
this, however, provides no speedy resolution to the dilemma the employer finds
himself in, since the organizers have thirty days within which to bring such
action. What is worse, there may be no resolution of the matter at all if the
organization chooses not to take the matter to the Board. The employer is thus
placed in the unenviable position of taking a chance on either violating the
rights of the union organizers, or abstaining from the exercise of his own property rights, permanently or until he or the union organizers can take the issue
to the Board. Such a dilemma is legally and ethically intolerable, particularly
at a time when emotions may be high and the line between right and wrong so
thinly drawn.
It would have been the height of injustice to preclude Sears from seeking a resolution of the dispute because of the inaction of the union. Indeed, as
Justice Blackmun noted in his concurring opinion, the problem of Garmon's
"no-man's land" is basically the problem of assuring that a question which
might be taken to the NLRB, is ultimately presented to that agency for its
solution.
Benke, supra note 30, at 809-10 (footnotes omitted); see also Comment, Concurrent Jurisdiction, supra note 151, at 386 ("The majority's decision and the dissent's reaction are best
understood not as a judgment on the relative value of an employer's right to be heard by a
judge and the union's right to be heard by the public but as a judgment whether equal
access to some tribunal is more important than the character of the tribunal.").
164. 436 U.S. at 206.
165. See id. at 207.
166. See id. at 219 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
167. See id.
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expertise in labor matters, could result in misapplication of the
NLRA in a way that would restrain protected conduct.""s In the
dissenters' view, these considerations more than counterbalanced
the majority's concern that Garmon would leave the employer
without a forum to challenge the trespassory picketing.1 s9 Although
the Court in Sears had closed the "no man's land" loophole of
71 it had
Garmon17 0 and had guaranteed a forum to the employer,
72
done so at a far greater cost to national labor policy.
The Court's focus in Sears on the difference between the issue
presented to the state court and the issue that would have been
presented to the NLRB173 was artificial, as one commentator
noted: "[T]he Sears plurality discussion of the same or different
controversies seems to artificially subdivide the activity in order to
emphasize the difference between the state and the NLRB cases.
In the real world, the pickets engage in a single activity-picketing.
Location and purpose cannot be so easily sep1 74
arated. ' The more pronounced danger of Sears, however, was
the Court's apparent attitude that NLRB preemption no longer

168. Id. at 224; see also Note, Accommodating Nonemployees, supra note 151, at 197
("Sears creates the risk that the pro-management or pro-umon inclinations of each state
court judge will be outcome determinative.").
169. See 436 U.S. at 216.
170. Brody, supra note 45, at 207; see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
171. See note 163.
172. Sears was even more ininucal to labor policy in light of the Court's decision two
years earlier in Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). In Hudgens, employees of a shoe
manufacturer had picketed the employer's retail outlet in a private shopping center as a
part of contract negotiation tactics. The shopping center owner had threatened the employees with arrest, forcing them to leave. The employees then had filed an unfair labor practice
complaint with the NLRB against the owner. See id. at 509-10. After the NLRB had issued
a cease and desist order, and the case had gone through several appeals and remands, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had enforced the Board's order, holding that competing constitutional considerations outweighed the protected nature of the
union's conduct. See id. at 510-12. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "the constitutional guarantee of free expression has no part to play in a case such as this" because "the
primary responsibility for making this accommodation [of private property rights and union
rights protected under section 7 of the NLRA] must rest with the Board in the first instance." Id. at 521, 522. The aberrational decision in Sears, which guaranteed decisions
against preemption, is fundamentally mconsistent with the important ancillary considerations underlying Hudgens.
173. According to Justice Stevens, this was the "critical inquiry" in Sears. 436 U.S. at
197.
174. Brody, supra note 45, at 218.

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:507

was a prerequisite for labor relations stability 175 If state courts are
not preempted, they may resolve important labor activity questions in a variety of ways. 17 6 By introducing and implicitly endorsing this lack of uniformity, 17 7 Sears, more than any other postGarmon decision, seriously damaged realistic prospects for achieving either procedural or substantive coordination of a workable labor preemption doctrine.
The dissenters in Sears accurately predicted that "erroneous determinations of non-pre-emption will occur and rights and inter178
ests protected by the [NLRA] will be irreparably damaged.'
They aptly described the majority opinion in Sears as a "drastic
abridgement of established principles [which] is unjustified and
unjustifiable.' 7 9 Many commentators have shared these concerns. e0 Professor Cox, for example, has stated that "the logical
consequence [of Sears] is that the wider a state's departure from
the national balance of the interests in union organization and

175. See Note, supra note 152, at 572.
176. See Sears, 436 U.S. at 233 n.14 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
177. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
178. 436 U.S. at 233 n.14 (Brennan, J., dissenting). One commentator, however, took issue
with the dissenters' assertion:
It is unlikely that Sears will fling open the doors to state interference in federal policy. Indeed, it appears the only time a state court will have unfettered
power to resolve an access issue will be when (1) the union involved could have
taken, but did not take, the issue in a timely manner to the National Labor
Relations Board, and (2) the issue is clearly one that is not a matter for federal
resolution by the National Labor Relations Board.
Benke, supra note 30, at 814.
179. 436 U.S. at 216 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
180. For example, one commentator has suggested that the Court in Sears "failed to simplify the doctrine of preemption." According to this commentator, the Court "put additional
embroidery onto an already complicated legal structure," which "will not encourage the coherent development of the preemption doctrine." Brody, supra note 45, at 223. On the other
hand, this same authority asserted that although the problems presented by state court
entry into complex labor preemption decisionmaking are formidable, they are surmountable
through greater cooperation between the state courts and the NLRB:
Garmon and Sears have created a situation under which the NLRB's jurisdiction, supposedly primary and exclusive, will to some indeterminate extent be
shared with state tribunals. The boundary between the areas of exclusive and
concurrent jurisdiction is uncertain and extremely difficult for anyone, and especially state courts, to find. The NLRB is best able to provide expert guidance in this field. Therefore, let the state courts consult the Board, and let the
Board cooperate with the state courts in deciding preemption questions.
Id. at 236.
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collective bargaining, the greater freedom the state will have to upset the national policy "I"~ Sears, according to Professor Cox, "lessens the predictability of preemption law."" 2 In different ways, all
of the commentators criticizing Sears have identified the most
dangerous aspect of it and other anti-preemption cases-the radical fragmentation and destabilization of the law.
Unfortunately, this erosion of the labor preemption doctrine
continued unabated. Less than a year later, m New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Department of Labor, s3 the Court
ruled that the NLRA did not preempt New York from providing
unemployment compensation to strikers in an industry subject to
NLRB jurisdiction.8 4 The Court rejected the employer's argument

181. Cox, supra note 44, at 285.
182. Id. at 291; see also Cox, Federalism, supra note 12, at 1343 ("Even if all states were
to adopt statutes phrased exactly like the NLRA secondary boycott prohibition, it would
not be surprising to find at least thirty different interpretations-it is not uncommon to get
two or three different interpretations from NLRB members on a single issue.").
183. 440 U.S. 519 (1979). For exhaustive commentary on New York Telephone, see Cox,
supra note 44, at 291-96; Note, NLRA Preemption of State Unemployment Compensation
Law ProvidingBenefits for Strikers-New York Telephone v. New York State Department
of Labor, 29 DEPAUL L. REV. 115 (1979); Note, State Unemployment Benefits to Strikers
and the Preemption Doctrine, 11 U. ToL.. L. REv. 143 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Unemployment Benefits]; Comment, New York Telephone v. New York State Department
of Labor: Limiting the Doctrine of Implied Labor Law Preemption, 46 BaOOiKLyN L. REv.
297 (1980).
184. Although the Court's decision was seriously fragmented, six justices voted to uphold
the state unemployment compensation benefit payments to the strikers. See 440 U.S. at 546
(opinion of Stevens, J., joined by White and Rehnquist, JJ.); id. at 547 (Blackmun, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, J.); id. at 546-47 (Brennan, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Stewart joined Justice Powell in a vitriolic dissent. Id. at 551 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
The Court's decision completed a line of federal court decisions concerning preemption in
the context of unemployment benefits for strikers, in which courts generally had found that
state action was not preempted. See Ohio Bureau of Unemployment Serv. v. Hodory, 431
U.S. 471 (1977) (Congress did not preclude states from denying unemployment benefits to
those involved in labor disputes); I.T.T. Lamp Div. v. Minter, 435 F.2d 989, 993 (1st Cir.)
(NLRA did not preempt state welfare law that provided benefits to strikers because the
state law arguably did not interfere with the NLRA or "palpably infringe" upon federal
labor policy), cert. dented, 402 U.S. 933 (1970); see also Amalgamated Transit Union, Div.
819 v. Byrne, 568 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1977) (New Jersey not preempted from conditioning
operating subsidies to transit companies on adherence to restrictions on wages, despite possible state interference with the national labor policy of free and unimpeded collective bargaming). But see Super Tire Eng'g Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 124 (1974) (recognizing
that state welfare benefit payments to strikers influence labor management relations and
relative bargaining power); Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 475 F.2d 449 (1st Cir.) (complaint
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that state unemployment compensation to strikers, financed in
part by employer contributions, was inimical to national labor policy and therefore invalid under the supremacy clause. I 5
The dispute in New York Telephone had begun in July 1971,
when Bell Telephone Company had become the target of a nationwide strike. Although the strike had been settled in most states
within a week, it had continued in New York for seven months. i8 6
Under the New York state unemployment insurance law,8 7 the
33,000 strikers in New York had been entitled to unemployment
compensation during the last five months of the strike. 188 At an
average benefit rate of $75 per week, the strikers had received
89
more than $49,000,000 in unemployment compensation.
New York Telephone objected to these payments primarily because state law required employers to underwrite most of the
cost. 19 0 According to New York Telephone, the state law forced the
phone company to finance the strike against itself. This anomaly,
the phone company maintained, fundamentally distorted the equilibruim in bargaining power between the parties, and was grossly
inimical to sound labor relations policy. 19 1
Justice Stevens, writing for a plurality of the Court, acknowledged the finding of the federal district court that "New York's
law
has altered the economic balance between labor and management."' 1 2 Justice Stevens, however, stated that the state unemployment compensation law was not intended primarily to regulate

challenging state unemployment benefits to striking workers, claiming preemption by the

NLRA, stated cause of action), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 858 (1973).
A related issue is whether ERISA preempts state regulation of employee benefit plans.

See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S. Ct. 2380 (1985); infra notes 313-39
and accompanying text; see also tnfra note 321 (citing authorities discussing ERISA
preemption).
185. See 440 U.S. at 525, 527.
186. Id. at 522.
187. N.Y. LAB. LAw §§ 590-591, 592.1 (McKinney 1977).
188. See 440 U.S. at 523.
189. See td.
190. See id. at 523-24; N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 570, 581.1(d)-(e), .2 (McKinney 1977).
191. See 440 U.S. at 526, 531-32.
192. Id. at 531-32. Justice Powell's dissenting opinion also acknowledged this finding, not-

ing that the benefits "substantially cushioned the economic impact of the lengthy strike on
the striking employees, and also made the strike more expensive for employers." Id. at 556

(Powell, J., dissenting).
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collective bargaining, but "instead to provide an efficient means of
insuring employment security." 19 3 According to Justice Stevens,
this objective was primarily a matter of state interest, and had
"limited relevance" to federal labor law. These findings, according
to Justice Stevens, supported the conclusion that the NLRA did
194
not preempt the New York state law.
The Court also found support for its decision in the NLRA and
the Social Security Act, as well as in the legislative histories of
these acts. Both statutes were completely silent concerning the
payment of unemployment benefits to strikers, which, according to
the Court, implied that Congress intended that the states should
be free to decide for themselves whether to pay benefits to strikers.1 95 Statements in the legislative histories 9 ' and subsequent actions of Congress 9 7 partially confirmed the Court's conclusion. Despite the at least incidental influence that the payment of
unemployment benefit to strikers would have on the balance of
power in the collective bargaining process, the Court held that a
state plan providing such payments would not be preempted "'in
the absence of compelling congressional direction.' "'s
An important area of disagreement among the justices concerned
9 m
the treatment of the Court's earlier decision m Machinists,"'
which the Court had found against preemption in an arguably
analogous situation. As one commentator pointed out, the Court in

193. Id. at 533.
194. See id.
195. Id. at 544.
196. Id. at 541-43.
197. Id. at 544-45.
198. Id. at 540 (quoting Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244).
At least one commentator has noted that the Court's scrutiny of the amorphous congressional intent at issue in New York Telephone was destined to be, at best, an obfuscatory
exercise in frustration:
In short, the legislative history of both the NLRA and the SSA provides
little basis for concluding that Congress specifically intended to permit state
benefits to strikers such as those proviaed by the New York system. Congress's
silence in 1935 and its subsequent failure to prohibit such state interference
are ambiguous. Thus, Justice Stevens was correct not to rest his opinion on a
finding of clear legislative intent; the inferences of intent that he did venture
are themselves open to question.
Comment, Balancing in Labor Law Preemption Cases: New York Telephone Co. v. New
York State Department of Labor, 32 STAN. L. REv.827, 832 (1980).
199. See supra notes 126-38 and accompanying text.
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Machinists had "established a general rule that, even when clear
evidence of congressional intent as to the particular practice was
lacking, the Court would presume congressional intent to preempt
virtually any state law that affected the balance of power between
labor and management.

200

Justice Stevens attempted to distin-

gush Machinists by asserting that the New York unemployment
compensation law, unlike the state law at issue in Machinists, was
not focused on labor conduct because only a small minority of the
unemployed workers who received benefits were unemployed as a
result of labor disputes. 20 ' Instead, the Court asserted, New York's
unemployment compensation insurance scheme was a law of "gen202
eral applicability" in which the State had a deep local interest.
As one critic astutely observed, Justice Stevens' attempt to distinguish Machinists was unconvincing: "[S]ince 'general applicability'
refers only to the scope of a state law, and not its effect, the label
is an undependable indication of the state and federal interests
'20
involved. 3
Fortunately, six justices disagreed with Justice Stevens concernmg this issue. These justices agreed that Machinists provided the
proper rules.20 ' Even these justices, however, could not agree on
the congressional intent underlying the NLRA. °5
Although at first glance the Burger Court appeared to accord a
rare victory to organized labor in New York Telephone, the
broader principle furthered was states' rights, at the ultimate expense of both organized labor and labor law jurisprudence. The
Court's strong preference for a diffusion of federal power to the
states transcended the labor relations interests of either the Court
or the parties to the case. One commentator noted: "In an era of
increasing centralization of government with the concomitant concentration of power in federal hands, [New York Telephone] may
200. Comment, supra note 198, at 835 (emphasis m original).

201. 440 U.S. at 32-33.
202. Id. at 533.
203. Comment, supra note 198, at 838.
204. See 440 U.S. at 546 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 549 (Blackmun, J., concurring);
id. at 560 (Powell, J., dissenting).
205. See 440 U.S. at 556-57 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 564-66 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
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be viewed as an important victory for states' rights. ' 20 6 Because of
this states' rights thrust, New York Telephone had ominous implications concerning the prospects for a coordinated and centralized
Hamiltonian federal labor policy. As a result of the decision, the
exceptions to the preemption doctrine were expanded radically because "general applicability" and "local concerns" concepts were
construed far more broadly than in the past. Under this broad construction, almost any state action could be classified within the exceptions to preemption. If the Court persists in this broad construction, power in many regulated areas may shift gradually from
the federal government to state governments. Such a shift of power
would significantly increase the potential for conflict between state
and federal regulatory schemes, contrary to the Court's longstand2 07
ing policy of avoiding such conflicts.
Sears and New York Telephone marked the Burger Court's
most concentrated debilitation of the strong labor preemption doctrine embodied in Garmon. Distressingly, this unwise doctrinal dismantling was undertaken without clear direction. As Professor Cox
pointed out, Sears and New York Telephone
do nothing to clarify the principles that govern federal preemption in labor law. One perceives little interest in logical consistency and less interest in building a coherent and continuing
body of law.
Perhaps it reflects a predominance of Justices
who are primarily pragmatists more concerned with the immediate outcome than with building a coherent body of law. 2 s
Unfortunately, this deliberate disavowal of the congressional policies that originally vitalized the NLRA has had continuing adverse
effects on national labor policy. As one commentator wrote in the
aftermath of Sears: "[T]he policy is no longer national uniformity
of union and employee rights in labor disputes, but rather a com' '20 9
promise between the exercise of state and federal jurisdiction.

206. Comment, Constitutional Law-Preemption-Preemptionof State Labor Law by
National Labor Relations Act-New York Telephone Company v. New York State Department of Labor, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 855, 883 (1981).
207. See Note, Unemployment Benefits, supra note 183, at 163.
208. Cox, supra note 44, at 300.
209. Note, supra note 159, at 335.
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Indeed, after Sears and New York Telephone, labor preemption
had little relation to labor law jurisprudence. Instead of focusing
on national labor law policies and issues, the Burger Court consciously was devoting itself to shifting the federal-state balance in
favor of state autonomy. Vitiation of the labor preemption doctrine
was one major consequence of that overarching objective.
V LABOR PREEMPTION DECISIONS IN THE 1980's: CONFUSION
COMPOUNDED, HOPE RENEWED, AND RENAISSANCE BEGUN

Four years passed between New York Telephone and the Burger
Court's next major labor preemption decision. When the Court finally did reenter the field in 1983 and 1984, it produced three
opinions that added to the confusion enveloping national labor
policy 10 Amidst the confusion, however, were hints of renewed judicial cognizance of the policies favoring labor preemption. This
unexpected but welcome development set the stage for two 1985
decisions in which the Court came to opposite results, 21 1 epitomizing the confusion afflicting the labor preemption doctrine. More
importantly, the Court's decisions between 1983 and 1985 laid the
groundwork, however fitfully, for the renaissance of the preemption doctrine that may have begun in 1986.212
A. Confusion Compounded: Labor Preemption Decisions in 1983
and 1984
The Court's first labor preemption decision in four years came in
Local 926, International Union of Operating Engineers v.
210. See Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union Local 54, 468
U.S. 491 (1984); infra notes 252-88 and accompanying text; Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S.
491 (1983); infra notes 235-51 and accompanying text; Local 926, Int'l Union of Operating
Eng'rs v. Jones, 460 U.S. 669 (1983); tnfra notes 213-34 and accompanying text.
211. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S. Ct. 2380 (1985) (holding that
the NLRA and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) did not preempt a
state mandated benefit law); infra notes 313-39 and accompaning text; Allis-Chalmers
Corp. v. Lueck, 105 S. Ct. 1904 (1985) (holding that section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947 did preempt state tort law claims "substantially dependent" upon
analysis of labor contract terms); infra notes 289-312 and accompanying text.
212. See International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Davis, 106 S. Ct. 1904 (1986); infra note
395; Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 106 S. Ct. 1395 (1986); infra notes
366-95 and accompanying text; Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v.
Gould Inc., 106 S. Ct. 1057 (1986); infra notes 341-65 and accompanying text.
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Jones.21 3 In that case, Jones, a supervisor, had taken a vacation

after his second day of work, by mutual agreement with his employer. When Jones had returned from vacation, the employer had
discharged him. Jones, who had joined a union in 1969 but had left
it in 1974, alleged that his resignation from the union had
prompted it maliciously to procure his discharge. He had filed an
unfair labor practice charge, but the NLRB had refused to issue a
complaint against the union.214 Jones then had sued the union in
state court for tortious interference with contractual relations.215

The trial court had dismissed Jones' lawsuit on preemption
grounds. 216 The Georgia Court of Appeals had reversed, concluding
that the local interest exception to preemption applied, and the
Georgia Supreme Court had denied review.211 The United States

Supreme Court again reversed, holding that the NLRA preempted
the state tort action.21 8
The Court began its analysis by stating the general principles
governing labor preemption analysis, which, according to the
Court, "have been stated and restated. 2 1 e The Court then stated:

"Not only is this case a variant of a familiar theme, but we have
213. 460 U.S. 669 (1983).
214. Id. at 671-73. in his unfair labor practice charge, Jones had alleged that the union
had "'procured' hIs discharge, 'and thereby [had] coerced [the Company] m the selection of
its supervisors and bargaining representatives, because [Jones] had not been a member in
good standing of said labor organization."' Id. at 672. The regional director had found insufficient evidence that the union had procured the discharge or that the union had restrained or coerced the employer m the selection of representatives for collective bargaining,
instead concluding "that Jones' discharge had been part of changes in the Company's supervisory structure and that the Umon had merely participated in discussions regarding the
changes." Id. at 673.
215. Id. at 673-74. Jones also had sought relief from his employer. Id.
216. See id. at 674. The trial court had concluded that the subject matter of the complaint was arguably within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board. See id.
217. See id. at 674-75. According to the Supreme Court[T]he State Court of Appeals held the cause of action not pre-empted because
Georgia had a deep and abiding interest in protecting its citizens' contractual
rights dnd because the cause of action, wlch sounded in tort, was so unrelated
to the concerns of the federal labor laws that it would not interfere with the
administration of those laws. As an additional reason for not finding preemption, the court stated that the Union's acts were not even arguably within the
ambit of § 7 or § 8 of the NLRA.
Id.
218. Id. at 678.
219. Id. at 676. The Court outlined its "familiar" approach as follows:
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heard this tune before [in Local No. 207, International Association of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers Union v.
Perko].' 'z 0 In Perko, the Court had held that the NLRA preempted a tort action against a union for interference with contractual relations because the conduct arguably was within the scope of
2 21
the NLRA.
Although the Georgia Court of Appeals had distinguished
Perko,2 the Supreme Court concluded that the facts of Perko
were indistinguishable from Jones, and therefore that preemption
also should apply m Jones. The Court held that sections 8(b)(1)(A)
and 8(b)(1)(B) of the NLRA, z3 which forbid union interference
with employees' protected rights and union attempts to coerce employers in the selection of bargaining representatives, respectively,
arguably applied to the conduct in Jones, just as they arguably
had applied to the conduct in Perko.224 According to the Court, "it

First, we determine whether the conduct that the State seeks to regulate or to
make the basis of liability is actually or arguably protected or prohibited by
the NLRA. Although the "Garmon guidelines [are not to be applied] in a literal, mechanical fashion," if the conduct at issue is arguably prohibited or protected otherwise applicable state law and procedures are ordinarily preempted. When, however, the conduct at issue is only a peripheral concern of
the Act or touches on interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, it could not be
inferred that Congress intended to deprive the State of the power to act, we
refuse to invalidate state regulation or sanction of the conduct. The question of
whether regulation should be allowed because of the deeply rooted nature of
the local interest involves a sensitive balancing of any harm to the regulatory
scheme established by Congress, either in terms of negating the Board's exclusive jurisdiction or in terms of conflicting substantive rules, and the importance of the asserted cause of action to the State as a protection to its citizens.
Id. (citations omitted).
220. Id. at 677 (citing Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963)).
221. See 373 U.S. at 708. Perko involved an employee who had been laid off from his job
as "superintendant and foreman" after the union had suspended him for violating a union
rule. The discharged employee had alleged that the union, in retaliation for his transgression, had conspired to deprive him of his right to earn a living by refusing to take orders
from him in Ins capacity as superintendant, which rendered him incapable of performing
that job, and by preventing him thereafter from obtaining work as a foreman, because he
had been suspended from the union. See id. at 703-04 & n.1.
222. See 460 U.S. at 675.
223. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A)-(B) (1982).
224. See 460 U.S. at 678-80. The Georgia court had held that neither of these sections
arguably applied in Jones, and thus had purported to distinguish Perko. See id. at 675.
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was for the Board, not the state courts, to decide whether Jones
was the kind of a supervisor who could invoke § 8(b)(1)(B)."225
On the other hand, the Court distinguished Sears, upon which
Jones relied. Jones argued that, under the test in Sears looking to
the similarity between the state court action and the potential
complaint before the NLRA,ss6 the Court should find against preemption because section 8(b)(1)(A) allows the NLRB only to examine coercive union conduct while the state court could consider
any tortious interference. 27 The Court rejected Jones' argument
for several reasons. 2 Most significantly, the Court noted that the
major distinction between the state court and the NLRB in Sears
was that the state court was concerned only with the location, and
not the purpose, of the labor conduct. In Jones, as the Court
pointed out, the purpose of the union's conduct clearly had been at
issue in both forums. 9
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist forcefully argued
that the "rigid" rules in Garmon had not survived recent labor
preemption decisions. 230 Essentially, Justice Rehnquist maintained

that Jones' state tort suit and unfair labor practice allegations did
not meet the "identical controversies" test of Sears, and therefore
that preemption should not apply231 According to Justice Rehnquist, Jones' suit in state court presented a far simpler decision
than his complaint before the NLRB, and it focused on substantially different facts.2"2
Despite the continuing vitality of Sears resulting from the valid
distinctions drawn in Jones, the Court's opinion contains perceptive, albeit implicit, acknowledgments of earlier criticisms of Sears
and its ramifications. The Court recognized that, read broadly,
Sears would vest state courts with virtually unrestrained authority
to decide complex labor law questions:
225. See id. at 680. The Court also rejected Jones' contentions that hIs action in state
court only peripherally concerned federal labor policy and that it fell under the deeply
rooted local interest exception to the labor preemption doctrine. Id. at 683.
226. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
227. 460 U.S. at 681.
228. See id. at 682-83.
229. See zd.
230. Id. at 685 n.2, 687 n.4 (Rehnqust, J., dissenting).
231. See id. at 690-92.
232. Id. at 691-92.
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[Plermitting state causes of action for noncoercive interference
with contractual relationships to go forward in the state courts
would continually require the state court to decide in the first
instance whether the Union's conduct was coercive, and hence
beyond its power to sanction, or noncoercive, and thus the
proper subject of a state suit. Decision on such questions
of fed238
eral labor law should be resolved by the Board.
Obviously, not all state courts attempting to exercise such broad
authority would possess sufficient labor law expertise. Many state
court decisions on labor preemption issues at best would be discordant and inimical to national labor policy As a result, the Court in
Jones carefully reined in an unduly broad reading of Sears.
This hobbling of Sears was desirable and long overdue. In effect,
the Court finally had recognized, and at least partially had neutralized, the potential abuse of the Sears rationale. At the time, however, Jones was only an isolated instance in which the Court had
found a state labor law action preempted.23 4
Fortunately, the Court's next labor preemption decision, Belknap, Inc. v. Hale,3 5 was more an object lesson to employers than
a further decay of the labor preemption doctrine. Although the
Court held that the NLRA did not preempt the state cause of action in question,2 6 Belknap was not fundamentally mnimcal either
to labor preemption or to Jones.
In Belknap, an employer had promised permanent employment
to several strike replacements. After the strike had ended, however, the employer had laid off the replacements to make room for
the returning strikers. The employer had agreed to reinstate the
strikers as a condition to settlement of an unfair labor practice
charge that the union had brought before the NLRB, complaining
that the employer had granted a wage increase to all employees

233. Id. at 682.
234. See supra note 111.
235. 463 U.S. 491 (1983). For commentary on Belknap, see Note, FederalLabor Law Preemption and Right to Hire PermanentReplacements: Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 26 B.C.L. REv.
63 (1984); Note, Labor Law-Preemption and the Rights of Replacement Employees, 57
Tms. L.Q. 911 (1984); Comment, Belknap, Inc. v. Hale-Problems With Preemption and
the Rights of Economtc Strikers, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 381 (1985); Comment, Labor Law Preemption and the Rights of Strike Replacements, 5 U. BRDGEPORT L. REv. 311 (1984).
236. See infra note 248 and accompanying text.
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who chose not to strike.23 7 Twelve of the laid-off strike replace-

ments had sued the employer in a Kentucky state court for mis238
representation and breach of contract.

The trial court had granted the employer's motion for summary
judgment, holding that the NLRA preempted the state action.239
The Kentucky Court of Appeals had reversed, holding that the
breach of contract and misrepresentation actions were not preempted because they "were of only peripheral concern to the
NLRA and were deeply rooted in local law.

'240

After the Kentucky

Supreme Court had vacated its order granting review, 241 the
United States Supreme Court took the case on writ of certiorari
24 2
and affirmed the court of appeals.

The employer in Belknap argued that the NLRA preempted the
state court suit because the state suit interfered with the employer's right to hire strike replacements, and thus upset the bargaining equilibrium of the parties. 243 The Court, however, rejected
this argument. The Court noted that, although an employer can
hire strike replacements, the NLRA does not shield employers
from liability for misrepresentations to the strike replacements.
Having disposed of the employer's contentions, the Court applied the general labor preemption tests outlined in Garmon and
Sears. According to the Court, it had "emphasized [in Sears] that
a critical inquiry in applying the Garmon rules. . is whether the
controversy presented to the state court is identical with that
which could be presented to the Board.

' 245

The Court held that

the controversies were not identical. First, the Court noted that
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

463 U.S. at 493-96.
Id. at 496-97.
See id. at 497.
See id.
See d.
Id.
Id. at 499.
The Court noted:
It is one thing to hold that the federal law intended to leave the employer and
the union free to use their economic weapons against one another, but it is
quite another to hold that either the employer or the union is also free to injure innocent third parties without regard to the normal rules of law governing
those relationships.

Id. at 500.
245. Id. at 510.
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the state court action had concerned the impact on the replacements rather than the impact on the strikers, making the issues
distinct. 246 Second, the Court pointed out that the state court action involved deep local concerns such as protecting citizens from
misrepresentations. These concerns, the Court held, were at most
only peripherally related to the policies underlying the NLRA 47
As a result, the Court concluded that the state suit was not
preempted. 4 8
Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion primarily to express
concern about the effect that the decision would have on the equilibrium between labor and management during a strike. Although
the majority suggested in a footnote that the impact on employers
would be minimal because an employer could avoid breach of contract and misrepresentation suits merely by conditioning its offer
to replacements to "avoid conflicting obligations to strikers and
replacements in the event of a settlement providing for reinstatement, ' 249 the dissent maintained that the need to condition offers
would work to the detriment of an employer in a strike situation
and thus would "interfere with the system of labor-management
relations established by Congress. ' 250 Such interference, in the dissent's view, would have a critical impact on the labor preemption
doctrine:
Permitting respondents to pursue their breach-of-contract
and misrepresentation claims m state court will subject employers to potentially conflicting state and federal regulation of their
activities; interfere with the orderly administration of the National Labor Relations Act; and alter the balance of power between labor and management struck by Congress. For these rea251
sons, the claims should be pre-empted.
The dissent's concerns were misplaced, because Belknap was not
deeply inimical to labor preemption principles. Although the Court
found that the NLRA did not preempt the state suit, its decision

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

511.
512.
505 n.9.
543 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
544.
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was more significant as a pointed lesson in labor relations to an
imprudent employer. If the employer merely had conditioned his
offers to the replacements as suggested by the Court, the employer
could have avoided the state suit. Despite the Court's discussion of
labor preemption principles, the preoccupation of both the majority and the dissent with how easily the employer could have
avoided the misrepresentation and contract clams indicates that
the Court really was focusing its pointed criticism on the employer's labor relations tactics rather than on preemption issues.
The Court's next major labor preemption decision came one year
later, in Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders
InternationalUnion Local 54.252 In that case, the Court held by a
narrow 4-3 margin that the NLRA did not preempt a New Jersey
law that imposed strict limitations on whom casino industry employees could choose as officials of their union.253
The New Jersey statute in question had been passed in 1976,
when New Jersey had amended its state constitution to allow casino gambling in Atlantic City. To protect against organized crime
and to gain public confidence, the New Jersey legislature had
passed the Casino Control Act,2 " which imposed strict regulation
upon the gambling industry. The New Jersey act required annual
registration by all persons and entities connected with the gambling industry,255 including "labor organizations that represent or
seek to represent persons employed in casinos or casino hotels. 2 56
Section 86 authorized the New Jersey Casino Control Commission
to disqualify any registrant that violated certain prohibitions
designed to prevent the involvement of organized crime in the
gambling industry.2 57 For unions, section 86 had proved particularly harsh because, if any officer, agent, or principal employee of
the union was disqualified under its provisions, another section of

252. 468 U.S. 491 (1984).

253. Id. at 512-13.
254.
255.
256.
257.

N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5.12-1 to 5.12-183 (West Supp. 1986).
See 468 U.S. at 495-96 (describing various provisions of the New Jersey act).
Id. at 496 (describing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5.12-93(a) (West Supp. 1986)).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5.12-86 (West Supp. 1986). The legislature's intent to prevent organized criminal activity is demonstrated by several prohibitions contained in the list. See,
e.g., id. § 5.12-86(f) (providing, in part, for disqualification of any individual identified "as a

career offender or a member of a career offender cartel").
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the New Jersey act required discontinuation of the union's privilege to collect membership dues, 258an action that could result in a
demolition of the union's effectiveness and ultimately of its members' rights under section 7 of the NLRA.
The dispute in Brown had begun in 1978, when Local 54 had
filed its first annual registration statement with the Casino Control
Commission. After a lengthy investigation, the commission in 1981
had determined that the union's president, secretary-treasurer,
and grievance manager should be disqualified for violations of section 86. When the commission had refused to hear the union's constitutional challenge to the New Jersey act, holding that it had no
authority to do so, the union had sought a preliminary injunction
against enforcement of the law in federal district court, claiming
that the law was preempted by various federal labor laws, including the NLRA. 259 The federal court had denied injunctive relief,
and the commission had proceeded to disqualify two of the three
officials implicated in the original investigation, 260 as well as the
business manager, and to order the union to remove the officials
from office. 26 1 The commission had warned that, in the event of
noncompliance, "Local 54 would be barred from collecting dues
from any of its members who were licensed or registered employees
'262
under the Act.
After the commission's final order, the union had appealed the
district court's denial of the injunction to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The court of appeals found in
favor of the union, holding that section 7 of the NLRA preempted
section 93 of the New Jersey Casino Control Act insofar as section
258. Id. § 5.12-93(b). Section 93(b) provided, in pertinent part:
No labor organization, union or affiliate
representing or seeking to represent employees licensed or registered under this act may receive any dues
from any employee licensed or registered under this act and employed by a
casino licensee or its agent, or administer any pension or welfare funds, if any
officer, agent, or principal employee of the labor organization, union or affiliate
is disqualified in accordance with the criteria contained in section 86 of this
act.
Id.
259. 468 U.S. at 498-99.
260. The third official named in the original investigation, the secretary-treasurer, had
died prior to the commission's final decision. Id. at 499 n.7.
261. Id. at 499.
262. Id.
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93 authorized the New Jersey commission to disqualify union officials otherwise properly elected pursuant to employee rights protected under section 7 263 On appeal, however, the United States
Supreme Court held that the New Jersey act was not preempted,
and it remanded the case to the Third Circuit.2 '
The Supreme Court relied on indications from New York Telephone and other cases that preemption should not be overextended. Citing these cases, the Court stated: "Section 7 of the
NLRA
neither contains explicit pre-emptive language nor otherwise indicates a congressional intent to usurp the entire field of
labor-management relations."2' 6 5 Although in 1945 the Court had
held in Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson26 6 that section 7 conferred on
employees an unfettered right to choose their own bargaining representatives, the Court stated that Hill was not controlling because
Congress later had restricted this right in the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959267 (LMRDA), in which Congress had imposed precise federal restrictions on the ability of individuals to hold union office. 268 Based on these restrictions, the
Court found that "the right of employees [under section 7 of the
NLRA] to select the officers of their bargaining representatives is
26 9
not absolute and necessarily admits of some exception.
The Court bolstered its finding by noting several other relevant
considerations. First, it pointed out that section 603(a) of the
LMRDA contains "'an express disclaimer of pre-emption of state
laws regulating the responsibilities of union officials, except where
such pre-emption is expressly provided.' ",270 Second, the Court
contended that Congress had passed the LMRDA because state

263. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union Local 54 v. Danziger, 709
F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd sub noma.
Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union Local 54, 104 S. Ct. 3179 (1984).
264. 468 U.S. at 512-13.
265. Id. at 501.
266. 325 U.S. 538 (1945); see supra note 54.
267. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982).
268. See 468 U.S. at 505. Specifically, section 504(a) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 504(a)
(West 1985), prohibits anyone convicted of certain enumerated crimes from holding union
office for five years following conviction or imprisonment. 468 U.S. at 505.
269. 468 U.S. at 505.
270. Id. at 505-06 (quoting De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 157 (1960) (plurality opinion)); see 29 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1982) (codifying § 603(a) of the LMRDA).
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governments had not done enough to fight corruption in union activities, and would not have intended to prevent states from doing
more to address the problem.2 7 1 Third, the Court noted that, in
upholding a similar New York statute against a preemption attack
in De Veau v. Braisted,7 it had found even more direct evidence
of Congress' intent concerning preemption of such statutes. In De
Veau, New York had passed the statute pursuant to a bi-state
compact between New York and New Jersey designed to fight
crime and corruption on those states' mutual waterfront. Congress
specifically had approved the compact, despite the contention of
union officials in committee hearings that it conflicted with federal
labor policy 27 ' According to the Court, Congress in approving the
compact over this objection apparently had concluded that, "at
least where the States were confronted with the 'public evils' of
'crime, corruption, and racketeering,' more stringent state regulation of the qualifications of union officials was not incompatible
with the national labor policy as embodied in § 7 [of the
NLRA]. 27 4 Based on these considerations, the Court concluded
that both federal law and state law legitimately can restrict the
right of employees under section 7 to select certain individuals as
officials of their institutional bargaining representative. 275 The
Court limited its finding, however, by stating that its decision did
"not implicate the employees' express § 7 right to select a particular labor union as their collective-bargaining representative, but
only their subsidiary right to select the officials of that union organization,"2 76 because the federal and state racketeering statutes
focused only on the individual conduct of union officials and not
on the qualifications of institutional bargaining representatives.
The Court then focused on the New Jersey act at issue in Brown.
The Court found that the New Jersey legislature, like the New
York legislature in De Veau, had passed the act to "'vindicate a
legitimate and compelling state interest, namely, the interest in

271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

468 U.S. at 506-07.
363 U.S. 144 (1960).
See 468 U.S. at 507.
Id. at 508.
Id at 509.
Id.
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combatting local crime infesting a particular industry.'

",277

Because

this intent focused on individual conduct rather than regulation of
labor organizations, and was indistinguishable from the intent behind the statute upheld in De Veau, the Court held that the
2 78
NLRA did not preempt the state law.

Although this portion of the opinion was not controversial because of Congress' clear intent not to preempt state law in the
area,2 7 9 the remainder of the opinion was controversial-not because of what the Court did decide, but because of what the Court
refused to decide. The controversial issue arose because the remedy under the New Jersey statute for a union's refusal to remove
disqualified union officials was suspension of the union's right to
collect membership dues. 2 0 This sanction could wreak havoc on a

union, and consequently on the union members' section 7 right to
select a union as their bargaining representative free from outside
interference. In Brown, eighty-five percent of the union's income
came from the monthly dues of its members.281 If the State deprived the union of its ability to collect dues, the union quickly
would collapse as an effective bargaining representative. 282 The
Court dodged this issue, however, purportedly "because of the procedural posture of th[e] litigation. '28 Noting that the "factual allegations [concerning the effect of the sanction on the union] were
never addressed by the District Court and the Court of Appeals,"
the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Third Circuit with
instructions to remand the case to the district court for "requisite
findings of fact to determine whether imposition of the dues collection ban will so incapacitate Local 54 as to prevent it from performing its functions as the employees' chosen collective-bargaining agent.

'284

The Court, however, sent a clear signal that even a

277. Id. (quoting De Veau, 363 U.S. at 155).
278. Id.
279. See supra notes 267-75 and accompanying text.
280. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5.12-93(b) (West Supp. 1986).
281. 468 U. at 511.
282. Without the ability to collect dues, the union argued, "it could no longer process
employee grievances, administer collective-bargaining agreements, bargain for new agreements, organize the unorganized, or perform the other responsibilities of a collective-bar-

gaining agent." Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
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lower court finding that the dues prohibition provision was preempted would not affect the other provisions of the New Jersey
28 5
law.
The problem with this position, as the dissent noted, was that
the dues sanction by definition impaired the union's ability to
function effectively as a bargaining agent because it imposed sanctions on the union itself rather than its individual officers. 288 A remand was not necessary, according to the dissent, to determine
that a deprivation of operating income would prevent the union
from functioning effectively as a bargaining agent. 8 7
The dissent is important because it points out the majority's
failure to conduct rigorous scrutiny of the separate sections of New
Jersey's statutory scheme. If New Jersey could not enforce the
statute by preventing recalcitrant unions from collecting dues, the
only alternative would be a mechanism that allowed the State to
act directly by compelling the union to remove objectionable individuals from office, rather than indirectly by suspending the right
to collect dues."8 8 The problem with a direct enforcement mechanism, however, is that it would require state intervention into
union governance, creating ancillary problems because this state
supervision would raise troublesome labor preemption questions.
The dissenting justices may have recognized these issues, and realized that the unanswered labor preemption questions associated
with alternative enforcement mechanisms could overwhelm the
otherwise unassailable portion of the majority's decision. Thus, the
dissent perhaps augured the future result of judicial failure to conduct rigorous scrutiny of state statutory schemes potentially inconsonant with labor preemption principles.
B. Preemptin Decisins in 1985: Hope Renewed
In Jones, Belknap, and Brown, the Court had taken a frustrating half step toward, several steps laterally, and several steps away
285. The Court stated: "We observe that even a finding that § 7 prohibits imposition of

the dues collection sanction need not imply that New Jersey's disqualification standards are
not otherwise enforceable by the Commission." Id.
286. Id. at 514 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
287. See id. at 515-16.

288. Cf. id. at 514 n.2 (suggesting that a direct sanction would not be preempted by the
NLRA).
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from a strong labor preemption doctrine. Given the bleak case law
that had preceded these decisions, however, even a half step forward was encouraging. These three decisions set the stage for the
Court's two 1985 labor preemption decisions, in which the Court
reached opposite results concerning preemption. Although those
opposite results perfectly highlighted the confusion afflicting the
labor preemption doctrine, they laid the groundwork for the doctrine's renaissance in the Court's 1986 preemption decisions.
In the first of the two 1985 decisions, Allis-Chalmers Corp. v.
Lueck,25 9 the Court built on the hopes that it had raised two years
earlier in Jones by finding that federal labor law preempts state
tort law claims that are "substantially dependent" on analysis of
labor contract terms.2 90 In Allis-Chalmers, Roderick Lueck sued
his corporate employer, as well as the insurer that handled the
company's group health and disability plan pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, for allegedly handling his insurance
claim in bad faith. 291 Under the grievance arbitration provisions in
the collective bargaining agreement, Lueck was required to pursue
"'any insurance-related issues that may arise from provisions of
the [Collective-Bargaining] Agreements' ",292 through expedited
grievance arbitration.2 93 Despite this contractual mandate, Lueck
had sought redress by filing a tort action in state court, seeking
recovery for alleged bad faith in handling his claim for a nonoccupational back injury. In his complaint, Lueck had alleged that the
company and the insurer "'intentionally, contemptuously, and repeatedly failed' to make disability payments under the negotiated
disability plan, without a reasonable basis for withholding the
'294
payments.

289. 105 S. Ct. 1904 (1985). For other discussions of Lueck, see Kinyon & Rohlik,
"Deflourng" Lucas Through Labored Characterizations:Tort Actions of Unionized Employees, 30 ST. Louis UL.J. 1, 18-24 (1985); Wheeler & Browne, Federal Preemption of
State Wrongful Discharge Actions, 8 INDus. REL. L.J. 1, 25-28 (1986); Comment, Employment At-Will in the Unionized Setting, 34 CATH. UL. REv. 979, 1011-13 (1985).
290. Id. at 1916.
291. See id. at 1907-08.
292. Id. at 1908 (quoting from the collective bargaining agreement).
293. See id. at 1907-08 (describing the four-step grievance procedure mandated by the
agreement).
294. Id. at 1908 (quoting Lueck's complaint).
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Although the lower state courts had held that Lueck's claim was
"'preempted by federal labor law,' ",295 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court had reversed.2 96 The state supreme court relied on the fact
that Lueck's claim was for "bad faith," which under Wisconsin law
was "distinguishable from a bad-faith breach of contract claim [because,] even though a breach of duty exists as a consequence of the
relationship established by contract, it is independent of that contract. 2 9 7 Because the terms of the labor contract purportedly were

not directly involved, the court reasoned that Lueck's claim did
not arise under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act 29 (LMRA), which provided a federal cause of action for
breaches of contracts among employers, employees, and labor organizations. 299 The Wisconsin court then proceeded to inquire
whether Lueck's state law claims nonetheless were preempted by
the NLRA. Applying a balancing test reminiscent of Sears,300 the
court determined that the claims were not preempted because the
bad faith tort was of substantial interest to the State of Wisconsin,
procedures were only of peripheral conwhile the disability clann301
cern to federal labor law.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that section
301 of the LMRA preempted Lueck's state law tort action.302 After
reviewing its precedent regarding section 301,03 the Court concluded that the range of section 301 extended beyond contract
suits per se.30 4 According to the Court, it also included a tort claim

that "is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of
295. Id. at 1909 (quoting the appendix to Lueck's petition for certiorari).
296. See id. at 1909 (citing Lueck v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 116 Wis. 2d 559, 342 N.W.2d 699

(1984)).
297. Id.
298. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
299. See 105 S.Ct. at 1909. Section 301 provides, in pertinent part- "Suits for violation of
may be brought in any district
contracts between an employer and a labor organization
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount
m controversy or without regard to the citizenslp of the parties." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1982).
300. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
301. See 105 S. Ct. at 1909.
302. See id. at 1916.
303. See id. at 1910-11 (citing Textile Workers Umon v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448
(1957), and Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962)).
304. 105 S. Ct. at 1911.
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565

the labor contract." 30 5 "Any other result," the Court asserted,

"would elevate form over substance and allow parties to evade the
requirements of § 301 by re-labeling their contract claims as
claims for tortious breach of contract."30 6 The Court then considered whether Lueck's claim fell under section 301 using this test.
The Court first noted that the insurance contract implicated federal labor law because "it is a question of federal contract interpretation whether there was an obligation under this labor contract to
provide the payments in a timely manner, and, if so, whether Allis30 7
Chalmers' conduct breached that implied contract provision.

'

The Court then concluded that, because Lueck's state tort suit inevitably would involve interpretation of the contract's provisions,
his claim had to be adjudicated using federal labor law.308
The Court summarized its holding by stating: "[W]hen resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis
of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor
contract, that claim must either be treated as a § 301 claim or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law."309 The
Court's holding was sound, not only because it represented a
proper construction of section 301, but also because it repudiated
Lueck's attempt to bypass the contractual grievance procedure
that had been agreed to in the collective bargaining agreement. 310
Unfortunately, the effect of the decision was limited, because the
Court declined to establish a general labor preemption rule to deal
with entire classes of cases.3 11 Instead, the Court reaffirmed its approval of the case-by-case approach to labor preemption cases:
"The full scope of the pre-emptive effect of federal labor-contract
law remains to be fleshed out on a case-by-case basis." 3 2
The convoluted retention of ad hoc decisionmaking in AllisChalmers epitomized the confusion that debilitated the labor
305. Id. at 1912.
306. Id. at 1911.
307. Id. at 1913.
308. See id. at 1914-15.
309. Id. at 1916 (citation omitted).
310. See d. at 1915 ("Since nearly any alleged willful breach of contract can be restated
as a tort claim for breach of a good-faith obligation under a contract, the arbitrator's role In
every case could be bypassed easily if § 301 is not understood to pre-empt such claims.").
311. See id. at 1916 (emphasizing the "narrow focus" of the Court's decision).
312. Id.
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preemption doctrine during the quarter century following Garmon.
Despite this confusion, and the Court's express reservations about
a strong labor preemption doctrine, however, Allis-Chalmers offered grounds for some cautious optimism. The decision represented a step, albeit a tentative one, toward a revitalized labor preemption doctrine that would restabilize national labor law theory
and practice by repudiating ad hoc atomism and dealing with entire classes of cases rather than with individual fact situations.
Two months after Lueck, the Court decided its second labor preemption case in 1985, Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts.3 1 3 In that case, the Court held that neither the NLRA
14
nor the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 19741
(ERISA) preempted a Massachusetts statute that mandated a
minimum floor for mental health care benefits.3 1 5 Metropolitan
Life involved a challenge by two insurance companies to a Massachusetts minimum benefit law that required health insurance policies to "provide 60 days of coverage for confinement in a mental
hospital, coverage for confinement in a general hospital equal to
that provided by the policy for non-mental illness, and certain
minimum outpatient benefits."3 16 The Massachusetts statute

313. 105 S. Ct. 2380 (1985). For a further discussion of MetropolitanLife, see McGill &
Moon, NLRA Preemption: The Free Play Doctrinein Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Massachusetts, 11 Emp. REL. L.J. 206 (1985).
314. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-309, 441, 1000-1461 (West 1985 & Supp. 1986).
315. 105 S. Ct. at 2399.
316. Id. at 2384 (describing MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 47B (West Supp. 1985)). In
a footnote, the Court quoted the pertinent portion of the Massachusetts law:
Any blanket or general policy of insurance
or any policy of accident and
sickness insurance
or any employees' health and welfare fund which
provid[es] hospital expense and surgical expense benefits and which [is)
promulgated or renewed to any person or group of persons in this commonwealth
shall, provide benefits for expense of residents of the commonwealth covered under any such policy or plan, arising from mental or nervous
conditions as described in the standard nomenclature of the American Psychiatric Association which are at least equal to the following mnimum
requirements:
(a) In the case of benefits based upon confinement as an inpatient in a
mental hospital
the period of confinement for which benefits shall be payable shall be at least sixty days in any calender [sic] year.
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typified the laws then in force m a majority of the states. 17
The Court first examined whether the Massachusetts statute was
preempted by ERISA. The Court began by examining the purpose
of the state law, suggesting initially that it was passed to protect
uninsured workers from the high cost of private mental health
care. 318 According to the Court, the Massachusetts legislature perceived that mandatory insurance would increase the incidence of
treatment at private community mental health centers, which provide better, more personal private care than state institutions.3 19
The Court concluded that the purpose of the statute was
to help safeguard the public against the high costs of comprehensive inpatient and outpatient mental health care, reduce
non-psychiatric medical-care expenditures for mentally-retarded
illness, shift the delivery of treatment from inpatient to outpatient services, and relieve the Commonwealth of some of the financial burden it otherwise
would encounter with respect to
3 20
problems.
mental-health
The Court then turned its attention to Congress' intent in
ERISA, which provides comprehensive federal regulation of employee pension and welfare plans. 2 1 Unlike the NLRA, ERISA

(b) In the case of benefits based upon confinement as an inpatient in a licensed or accredited general hospital, such benefits shall be no different than
for any other illness.
c) In the case of out-patient benefits, these shall cover, to the extent of five
hundred dollars over a twelve-month period, services furnished (1) by a comprehensive health service organization, (2) by a licensed or accredited hospital
(3) or subject to the approval of the department of mental health services furnished by a community mental health center or other mental health clinic or
day care center which furnishes mental health services or (4) consultations or
diagnostic or treatment sessions.
Id. at 2384 n.11 (quoting MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 47B (West Supp. 1985)).
317. Id. at 2384; see id. at 2384 n.10 (noting that 26 states had promulgated 69 such
mandated benefit laws).
318. Id. at 2385.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. See 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-309, 441, 1000-1461 (West 1985 & Supp. 1986). For exhaustive commentary concerning ERISA preemption, see Hutchinson & Ifshmn, FederalPreemption of State Law Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 46 U. CHL
L. REv. 23 (1978); Kilberg & Heron, The Preemption of State Law Under ERISA, 1979
DuKE L.J. 383; Kilberg & Inman, Preemption of State Law Under ERISA: Drawing the
Line Between Laws That Do and Laws That Do Not Relate to Employee Benefit Plans, 19
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contains a broad express preemption clause that precludes any
state law regulating employee benefit plans.3 22 That otherwise
broad provision, however, includes an "insurance saving clause"
which, with one narrow exception, excludes from preemption "any
State law that regulates insurance, banking, or securities. 's23 The
insurance companies argued that the saving clause should not apply to the Massachusetts statute because that law "in reality [was]
a health law that merely operates on insurance contracts to accomplish its end. 3 24 The Court, however, stated that, in interpreting
the saving clause, "[t]he presumption is against pre-emption, and
we are not inclined to read limitations into federal statutes in
order to enlarge their pre-emptive scope."3 25 Because the Court
could find no indication in the legislative history of ERISA that
countermanded this presumption, 26 the Court concluded that the
saving clause protected the Massachusetts law from preemption by
3 27
ERISA.
Having determined that ERISA did not preempt the mandated
benefit law, the Court turned its attention to whether the NLRA
had any preemptive effect. The insurance companies argued that it
did, because the Massachusetts statute and other similar laws "in
162 (1983); Kilberg & Inman, Preemption of State Laws Relating to Employee Benefit Plans:An Analysts of ERISA Section 514, 62 Thx. L. REv. 1313 (1984); Okra, Preemption of State Insurance Regulation by ERISA, 13 FORUM 652 (1978); Pantos, Preemption
Litigation Under ERISA, 3 Emp. REL. L.J. 336 (1978); Turza & Halloway, Preemption of
State Laws Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 28 CATH. U.L.
REV. 163 (1979); Note, ERISA: Preemption of State Health Care Laws and Worker WellBeing, 1981 U. ILL. L. REv. 825; Note, ERISA Preemption of State Law: The Meaning of
"Relate To" in Section 514, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 143 (1980); Comment, ERISA and the Preemption of State Law, 6 FoRDHAm UPB. LJ. 599 (1978); Comment, ERISA and State Law
Preemption, 6 N. Ky. L. Rav. 379 (1979); Comment, Attachment of PensionBenefits Under
FORUM

ERISA, 74 Nw. U1. REv. 255 (1979).

322. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982) (codifying § 514(a) of ERISA) (declaring that ERISA
shall "supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan").
323. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (codifying § 514(b)(2)(B) of ERISA) (declaring that nothing in
ERISA "shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which
regulates insurance, banking, or securities").
324. 105 S. Ct. at 2390.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 2390, 2392-93.
327. Id. at 2393. The Court also noted that its result was consistent with its interpretation of the term "business of insurance" in the saving clause of the preemption provision in
the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1982). See 105 S. Ct. at 2391.
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effect mandate terms of collective-bargaining agreements," '2 8 conflicting with the implicit structural policies of the NLRA and the
congressional intent to leave the terms of employee insurance benefit plans to the private parties' collective bargaining process, free
of state regulation. 29 Although the Massachusetts law did interfere
to some extent with collective bargaming, 3 0 the Court noted that
such interference did not justify preemption under the primary jurisdiction analysis of Garmon because the conduct involved was
not prohibited or protected under sections 7 or 8 of the NLRA.3 3 1
Instead, according to the Court, MetropolitanLife implicated the
second wing of the labor preemption doctrine, the unregulable activity principle, which examines whether the state law frustrated
the policies implicated by the Act but not expressly included in
sections 7 and 8.332 Even though employee welfare benefits generally are a mandatory subject of collective bargammg 333 and cannot
be imposed on the parties externally absent their mutual agreement,3 34 the Court held that the extent of the interference with
collective bargaining under the state law was not sufficiently incompatible with the NLRA to trigger preemption. According to the
Court, the Massachusetts law did not work to the detriment of collective bargaining; instead, it protected employees by establishing
a minimum floor for mental health benefits, beneath which the labor negotiation process was not free to go. The Court noted:
It would further few of the purposes of the Act to allow unions and employers to bargain for terms of employment that
state law forbids employers to establish unilaterally.
It
would turn the policy that animated the [NLRA] on its head to
understand it to have penalized workers who have chosen to join
a union by preventing them from benefitting from state labor
328. 105 S. Ct. at 2393-94.
329. Id. at 2394.
330. According to the Court, "faced with § 47B, parties to a collective-bargaining agreement providing for health insurance are forced to make a choice: either they must purchase
the mandated benefit, decide not to provide health coverage at all, or decide to become selfinsured, assuming they are m a financial position to make that choice." Id.
331. Id.
332. Id., see supra note 138 and accompanying text.
333. See Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers, Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971) (cited in MetropolitanLife, 105 S. Ct. at 2395-96).
334. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 399 U.S. 97 (1970).
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regulations imposing
33 5
employers.

minimal

standards

on

non-union

The Court concluded:
No incompatibility exists, therefore, between federal rules
designed to restore the equality of bargaining power, and state
or federal legislation that imposes minimal substantive requirements on contract terms negotiated between parties to labor
agreements, at least so long as the purpose of the state legislation is not incompatible with these general goals of the
336
NLRA.
The Court reached its holding that the Massachusetts law was
not preempted by interpreting state police powers in a very expansive manner, both in analyzing preemption under ERISA and in
analyzing preemption under the NLRA. In the Court's ERISA
analysis, it took a giant step backward from the position in favor of
broad ERISA preemption that it had established only two years
earlier.93 7 This retreat had serious implications for the labor preemption doctrine in general, because ERISA is part of the group of
federal enactments that comprises federal employment law33 8 and
because an undeniable synergy exists between preemption principles as they are applied to the individual laws within this group.
The Court's holding concerning preemption by the NLRA, however, has even more serious implications, because it will make
achievement of meaningful national legislation to address the inherently national problem of coordinating national labor policy
much more difficult.
The Court's decision was not particularly surprising because the
statute in Metropolitan Life, like the one in Brown, had a plainly
commendable purpose. Although the evils addressed by the Massachusetts statute cannot be discounted, the Court upheld that statute against a preemption attack at a greater long-term cost to the
prospect for Hamiltonian federalism in federal employment law.
After Metropolitan Life, the many states that currently have no

335.
336.
337.
338.

105 S. Ct. at 2398.
Id. at 2397.
See Shaw v. Delta Air Lmes, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
See supra note 5.
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mandated benefit legislation now have no incentive not to adopt
such laws. Further state enactments would add even more layers of
interference with the federal scheme. More importantly, the decision debilitates any possible congressional efforts toward enacting
national legislation. Although most states have mandated benefit
laws,3 3 9 the many states without such laws have chosen to leave

these matters solely to the collective bargaining process, a pyrrhic
victory for the NLRA because workers in these states most likely
will be left without mandatory benefit protection in the absence of
uniform federal health benefits legislation. The Court's decision in
Metropolitan Life to uphold state mandatory benefit laws will seduce Congress into directing its energy toward other priorities,
under the erroneous assumption that all states will afford
mandatory benefit protections to employees similar to the protections provided in Massachusetts.
From a narrow perspective, Metropolitan Life is a technically
correct and narrow decision that provided a victory for some unionized and most nonunionized employees in Massachusetts, and a
vindication for the State's enlightened, socially responsible use of
its police powers. From a broader perspective, however, Metropolitan Life perpetuates the national checkerboard of inconsistent
state laws that hamstrings effective national labor policy. In short,
the Court's decision in Metropolitan Life may have provided a
limited, short-term advantage to weak unions and nonunionized
employees in states with mandated benefit laws, but at a greater
cost to the long-term national welfare. This short-term orientation,
inherent in the Court's ad hoc evaluations of likely immediate winners and losers in individual cases, was very much in need of
change. Fortunately, major steps toward effecting the change from
ad hoc evaluations to principled general resolutions may have occurred in 1986.
C. Labor Preemption Decisions in 1986: Renaissance Begun
The unexpected but very welcome renaissance of the labor preemption doctrine finally may have begun with the unequivocal
339. See supra note 317.
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holdings in the Supreme Court's three substantive 340 labor preemption decisions in 1986. Although these decisions perhaps did
not constitute a complete vindication of, or an absolute return to,
classic labor preemption principles, they nevertheless marked a
fortunate, praiseworthy moment in the confused, tortured history
of the doctrine. Coming after the muddle of case law in the first
half of the 1980's, during which the Court sent thoroughly mixed
signals regarding labor preemption, these 1986 decisions could
serve as a beacon for revitalization of the labor preemption doctrine. They enable proponents of a strong preemption doctrine to
indulge in cautious optimism for the immediate future, at least until the triumph of the states' rights ideology threatened by possible
realignment during the tenure of the Rehnquist Court.
The first of the 1986 decisions, Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations v. Gould Inc.,34 1 involved a challenge to a statute that directed the Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations to maintain a list of every
person or firm judicially determined to have committed three separate violations of the NLRA in three separate cases within a fiveyear period.3 42 Under the statute, a name placed on the list
remained there for three years.343 During that period, state procurement agents were forbidden from buying products manufac3 44
tured by the violator.

340. The Court decided a fourth labor preemption case in 1986, but that case involved a
procedural question rather than substantive doctrinal issues. See International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Davis, 106 S. Ct. 1904 (1986); infra note 395.
341. 106 S. Ct. 1057 (1986).
342. Wis. STAT. § 101.245 (Supp. 1985); see 106 S. Ct. at 1060 n.1 (quoting the statute).
343. Wis. STAT. § 101.245(4) (Supp. 1985).
344. Wis. STAT. § 16.75(8) (Supp. 1985). In a footnote, the Court quoted the pertinent
part of the statute:
The department [of administration] shall not purchase any product known
to be manufactured or sold by any person or firm included on the list of labor
law violators compiled by the department of industry, labor and human relations under a. 101.245. The secretary may waive this subsection if maintenance,
repair or operating supplies are required to maintain systems or equipment
which were purchased by the state from a person or firm included on the list
prior to the date of inclusion on the list, or if the secretary finds that there
exists an emergency which threatens the public health, safety or welfare and a
waiver is necessary to meet the emergency.
See 106 S. Ct. at 1060 n.2 (quoting Wis. STAT. § 16.75(8) (Supp. 1985)).
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Gould Inc. had been placed on the list in 1982 after four NLRB
orders against divisions of the company had been judicially enforced. As a result, the State had informed Gould that it would not
enter into any new contracts with the company until 1985, and
that it would not honor current contracts unless the State would
become subject to contractual penalties if it rejected those contracts. The State's action had affected more than $10,000 worth of
contracts and $10,000 in bids that Gould had with the State." 5
Gould had sought injunctive and declaratory relief in federal
court, claiming that the Wisconsin statute was preempted by the
NLRA.3

46

The United States District Court for the Western Dis-

trict of Wisconsin had granted the requested injunctive relief, finding that the NLRA preempted the state law.. 7 After the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had affirmed this
finding, 8 the Wisconsin department charged with enforcing the
statute had appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
The unanimous Supreme Court in Gould relied directly on the
broad preemption rule in Garmon, which the Court described as
"[c]entral" among labor preemption principles. The Court began
by restating its conception of the rule: "[T]he Garmon rule
prevents states not only from setting forth standards of conduct
inconsistent with the substantive requirements of the NLRA, but
also from providing their own regulatory or judicial remedies for
conduct prohibited or arguably prohibited by the Act."349 The
Court then began its application of the rule by stating that if Wisconsin had passed a law forbidding private parties from doing business with repeat labor law violators, the NLRA clearly would have
preempted the law because the law "would interfere with Congress'
'integrated scheme of regulation' by adding a remedy to those prescribed by the NLRA."3 50 The fact that the remedy would have
been substantially different from remedies available under the

345. 106 S. Ct. at 1060.
346. Id. Gould also brought equal protection and due process claims against the statute,
but neither the trial court nor the appellate courts reached these issues. See id. at 1060-61.
347. See id. at 1061.

348. See id. (citing Gould, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations,
750 F.2d 608 (7th Cir. 1984)).
349. Id. at 1061.
350. Id. (quoting Garmon, 359 U.S. at 247).
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NLRA did not matter, according to the Court, because under Garmon "'judicial concern has necessarily focused on the nature of
the activities which the States have sought to regulate, rather than
on the method of regulation adopted.' ",351 Preemption was necessary, the Court stated, because allowing additional remedies "'accentuates52 the danger of conflict'" between the states and the
NLRB.
Wisconsin argued that the result should be different for a statute
that prohibited purchases by the State rather than by private parties because such a law is an exercise of the State's spending power
rather than its regulatory power.35 3 In essence, Wisconsin claimed
that it was acting merely as a "private purchaser of services, 3 54

and thus was not subject to the usual restrictions that the commerce clause places on state regulatory power.3 55 The Court re-

jected the State's distinction, however, by noting that even the
State conceded that the purpose of the statute was "to deter labor
law violations and reward 'fidelity to the law,' ",356 a purpose that
clearly was regulatory in nature. The Court unequivocally stated:
"[F]or all practical purposes, Wisconsin's debarment scheme is
tantamount to regulation.

3 57

The Court also rejected the State's

distinction by asserting that approval of the debarment scheme,
free from the sweep of NLRA preemption, might result in an even
more broadly based conflict with the NLRA because other states
measures. 358 Indeed, four
might be encouraged to enact similar
59
other states already had done so.

The obvious presence of the NLRA vitiated Wisconsin's reliance
on the "state as market participant" argument.38 0 The Court as351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.

Id. (quoting Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243).
Id. (quoting Garmon, 359 U.S. at 247).
Id. at 1061-62.
See td. at 1063.
See id. at 1062-63.
Id. at 1062.
Id. at 1063.
See td. at 1062.

359. See td. at 1062 & n.6 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-57a (Supp. 1985); MD. STATE FIN.
& PROCUREMENT CODE ANN. § 13-404 (1985); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 423.322 to .324
(West Supp. 1985); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 121.23 (Page 1984)).
360. See id. at 1063 ("What the Commerce Clause would permit States to do in the absence of the NLRA is thus an entirely different question from what States may do with the
Act m place.").
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serted that, while private boycotts of labor law violators would not
be prohibited by the NLRA, publicly enforced boycotts are different. 36 The NLRA forbids state but not private action, the Court
stated, "not merely because the[se actions] take different forms,
but also because in our system States simply are different from
'362
private parties and have a different role to play.
Although the Court in Gould certainly revitalized the labor preemption doctrine, the decision was not absolute in its sweep. The
Court concluded by carefully restating the exceptions under the labor preemption doctrine for matters of "peripheral concern" to the
NLRA and for "interests deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility, 3 63 which the Court had invoked in so many previous cases
to avoid a finding of preemption.'" The ease with which the Court
found that the Wisconsin statute did not fall within these exceptions, 615 however, inspires hope that the labor preemption doctrine
is beginning to return to its proper place as a part of a sound national labor policy.
The Court's second substantive labor preemption decision in
1986, Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 36 6 followed six weeks later. The dispute in Golden State had arisen in
1981, when taxi drivers for Golden State Transit Corporation had
gone on strike immediately before the Los Angeles City Council
was scheduled to consider renewing operating franchises for
Golden State and twelve other taxi companies. The city council
361. See id.
362. Id. Many scholars, primarily those affiliated with critical legal studies, condemn as
illusion and artifice the purported bifurcation between the public and private realms, such
as the distinction advanced by the Court in Gould. See, e.g., Klare, The Public/Private
Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. Rlv. 1358 (1982).
363. 106 S. Ct. at 1063.
364. See supra notes 87-88 & 111 and accompanying text.
365. The Court stated:
But Wisconsin's debarment rule clearly falls into none of these categories. We
are not faced here with a statute that can even plausibly be defended as a
legitimate response to state procurement constraints or to local economic
needs, or with a law that pursues a task Congress intended to leave to the
States. The manifest purpose and inevitable effect of the debarment rule is to
enforce the requirements of the NLRA. That goal may be laudable, but it assumes for the State of Wisconsin a role Congress reserved exclusively for the
Board.
106 S. Ct. at 1064.
366. 106 S. Ct. 1395 (1986).
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had approved all but one of the other renewal applications routinely, but it had delayed action on Golden State's application.36 7
One week before the scheduled expiration of Golden State's
franchise, the city council had voted overwhelmingly against renewal3 6 because it felt that Golden State had not dealt fairly with
the strikers. 6 9
Golden State had sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary
relief in federal court, arguing that the disapproval of the franchise
renewal was an attempt to coerce it into settling its dispute with
the union, and that the NLRA preempted such local interference
in collective bargaining.3 70 The United States District Court for the
Central District of California had found "that it was 'undisputed

that the sole basis for refusing to extend [Golden State's] franchise
was its labor dispute with the Teamster drivers,' "3'71 and it had
granted Golden State's motion for a preliminary injunction to preserve the franchise. 7 2 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit had found "ample evidence" for the district court's

finding, but it had vacated the preliminary injunction because it
felt "that Golden State had little chance of prevailing on its preemption claim. 37 3 After an unsuccessful petition for certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court,3 7 4 the district court had granted
the City's motion for summary judgment,3 75 and the Ninth Circuit

367. Id. at 1396.
368. Id. at 1397.
369. In the city council's consideration of Golden State's application, according to the
Court, "[tihe strike was central to the discussion. One council member charged Golden
State with negotiating unreasonably, while another accused the company of trying to
'brea[k] the back of the union.' The sympathies of the council members who spoke lay with
the union." Id. (citations omitted). The council's action had gone against the recommendation of the City's Board of Transportation Commissioners, as well as the recommendation of
the council's own Transportation and Traffic Committee, which specifically had found that
Golden State and the other twelve companies seeking franchise renewals were "'in compliance with all terms and conditions of their franchise[s].'" Id. at 1396.
370. See td. at 1397.
371. Id. (quoting Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 520 F Supp. 191, 193
(C.D. Cal. 1981)).
372. See zd.
373. Id. (citing Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 686 F.2d 758, 759, 762
(9th Cir. 1982)).
374. See id. (citing Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 459 U.S. 1105
(1983), denying cert. to 686 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1982)).
375. See id.
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had affirmed.3 76 The court of appeals had said that it "found nothing in the record to suggest that the city's nonrenewal decision
'was not concerned with transportation,' "M" and it had found
against preemption because it viewed such transportation regulation as only a peripheral, incidental concern of labor policy.3 78
The Supreme Court began its consideration of the case by citing
with approval the strong labor preemption principles of Garmon,
which it had reaffirmed in Gould just six weeks earlier. 37 9 The
Court, however, found reliance on the primary jurisdiction prmciple of Garmon unnecessary.380 Instead, the Court relied on the second major wing of labor preemption, the unregulable activity principle.3 8 Under this second principle, which had originated in
Machinists38 2 and had been applied in Metropolitan Life,38 3 state
regulation was preempted if it "'concern[ed] conduct that
Congress intended to be unregulated' ,," because of its desire to
leave this conduct "'to be controlled by the free play of economic
forces.' ,,385
The Court ruled that the NLRA preempted the City's action.386
The Court stated that the threatened denial of Golden State's application had altered the balance of economic weapons held by the
company and by the union through imposition of "a positive durational limit on the [company's] exercise of self-help.

' 38 7

By intrud-

ing into the dispute, the Court held, "the city directly interfered
' ' 388
with the bargaining process-a central concern of the NLRA.

376. See id. (citing Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 830 (9th
Cir. 1985)).
377. Id. (quoting 754 F.2d at 833).
378. See td.
379. See id. at 1398.
380. The Court never reached the issue of preemption under Garmon becase Golden
State did not argue it. See id. at 1398 n.4.
381. See id. at 1398.
382. See supra notes 131-38 and accompanying text.
383. See supra notes 332-36 and accompanying text.
384. 106 S. Ct. at 1398 (quoting Metropolitan Life, 105 S. Ct. at 2394).
385. Id. (quoting Machinists,427 U.S. at 140, which, in turn, was quoting NLRB v. NashFinch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971)).
386. See id. at 1401.
387. Id. at 1399.
388. Id. at 1400 n.8.
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The City attempted to avoid this result by arguing that "it was
not regulating labor, but simply exercising a traditional municipal
function in issuing taxicab franchises."38 9 The Court rejected this
argument, viewing it as similar to Wisconsin's argument in Gould
that it was acting under its spending power and not under its regulatory power.39 0 The Court also was unsympathetic to the City's
contention that it was in a "no-win situation" because it would
have been perceived as favoring the employer in the labor dispute
if it had renewed the franchise.""1 According to the Court:
[T]he question is not whether the city's action favors one side or
the other. Our holding does not require a city to renew or to
refuse to renew any particular franchise. We hold only that a
city cannot condition a franchise renewal
in a way that intrudes
39 2
into the collective-bargaining process.
Having rejected these contentions, the Court concluded that the
City's action was preempted because it "destroyed the balance of
power designed by Congress, and frustrated Congress' decision to
leave open the use of economic weapons."39 3
Justice Rehnquist filed a sharp dissent, in which he asserted that
the majority's decision gave the labor preemption doctrine an "extraordinary breadth" that went far beyond the Court's initial labor
preemption cases. 39 4 In Justice Rehnquist's view:
[T]he mighty oak of this Court's labor pre-emption doctrine
sweeps ever outward though still totally uninformed by any express directive from Congress.
The entire body of this Court's labor law pre-emption
doctrine has been built on a series of implications as to congressional intent in the face of congressional silence, so that we now
have an elaborate pre-emption doctrine traceable not to any expression of Congress, but only to statements by this Court in its
previous opinions of what Congress must have intended.

389. Id. at 1400.
390. Id., see supra notes 353-59 and accompanying text.

391. See 106 S. Ct. at 1401.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 1402 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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I do not believe that Congress intended the labor law net
to be cast this far.39 5

395. Id. at 1403.
The Court's third substantive labor preemption decision in 1986, Baker v. General Motors
Corp., 54 U.S.L.W 5037 (U.S. July 2, 1986), involved a challenge to a Michigan unemployment compensation law which was reminiscent of the law challenged eight years earlier in
New York Telephone. See id. at 5037 & n.1; supra notes 183-207 and accompanying text. In
Baker, strikers at three GM foundries, where UAW locals had continued striking after the
UAW and GM had reached a contract agreement at the national level, had received union
strike benefits. These local strikes had caused GM to curtail operations temporarily at other
GM facilities. Many of the 19,000 employees laid off as a result of this curtailment had
claimed Michigan unemployment compensation benefits. 54 U.S.L.W. at 5038. The Michigan Supreme Court had upheld the State's denial of benefits to the employees, which had
been based on the contention that the claimants' unemployment was caused by the strike,
which had been financed by the union strike benefits. See id. at 5038-39.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Michigan court's decision, holding that
the NLRA did not preempt the state law. Id. at 5042. This decision, considered together
with New York Telephone, in which the Court had held that the NLRA also did not preempt a New York unemployment compensation law that provided benefits to strikers, illustrates perfectly the chaos in labor policy that can occur when directly opposite state labor
laws are not preempted by a coherent, uniform federal labor policy. Given the Court's endorsement of a strong labor preemption doctrine in its other 1986 cases, however, Baker
may be considered a mere aberration limited to its facts-the illegitimate but predictable
progeny of New York Telephone.
The Court decided another labor preemption case in 1986, International Longshormen's
Ass'n v. Davis, 106 S. Ct. 1904 (1986), which primarily involved federal procedure rather
than the labor preemption doctrine as such. In Davs, a ship superintendent allegedly had
been fired for participating in union-related activities. The superintendent had sued the
union in state court for fraud and misrepresentation, claiming that the union had promised
to get him reinstated if such a firing occurred but had failed to keep that promise. The
union had defended the suit on the merits throughout the trial, failing to argue that the
labor preemption doctrine deprived the state court of jurisdiction until after the discharged
superintendent had won a jury verdict of $75,000. Id. at 1907-09.
The Alabama Supreme Court had upheld the verdict, holding that the union had waived
the preemption argument by failing to plead it as an affirmative defense. See id. at 1909.
The United States Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the Alabama court's resolution
of the "procedural" waiver issue, although it ultimately affirmed the decision on other
grounds. The Court stated:
A claim of Garmon pre-emption is a claim that the state court has no power to
adjudicate the subject matter of the case, and when a claim of Garmon preemption is raised, it must be considered and resolved by the state court. Consequently, the state procedural rule relied on by the Alabama Supreme Court
to support the judgment below was not a sufficient state ground, and the
Union was and is entitled to an adjudication of its pre-emption claim on the
merits.
Id. at 1913. But see id. at 1918 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the Court's
conclusion "that National Labor Relations Act pre-emption is 'jurisdictional,' and hence can
be raised at any time"). The Court then proceeded to consider the merits of the preemption
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Gould and Golden State certainly do not guarantee the future of
the labor preemption doctrine. As Justice Rehnquist pointedly
noted in his dissent in Golden State, Congress has failed to provide any statutory clarification of its intent, which guarantees future judicial wrestling with the often delphic labor preemption
doctrine. Nevertheless, these most recent decisions are strong reaffirmations of the labor preemption doctrine-a surprising development given the erosion of the doctrine that had characterized the
Court's previous decisions. Whether these decisions will reverse the
past quarter century of decay, marking a return to classic
Hamiltonian principles, or will prove to be surprising but isolated
aberrations, marking merely a temporary hiatus from continued
doctrinal erosion, remains to be seen. The nearly unanimous stance
of the Court in these decisions, however, justifies at least a cautiously optimistic hope that they could mark the beginning of a
renaissance for the labor preemption doctrine. The ominous and
indeterminate judicial "wild card" will be the extent to which Justice Rehnquist, in his new position as Chief Justice, can galvanize a
new Jeffersonian majority on the Court. If states' rights jurisprudence ultimately prevails, any hope for Hamiltonian federalism
will collapse, with profound adverse ramifications extending far beyond the bounds of the labor preemption doctrine and national labor policy
VI.

CONCLUSION

The quarter century after Garmon generally witnessed the
steady erosion of the labor preemption doctrine and the debilitation of prospects for restoration of a sound national labor policy
The Court steadily engrafted many exceptions onto the labor preemption doctrine. These exceptions perhaps seemed valid when

issue, concluding that the state tort action was not preempted because the umon had failed
to meet its burden of proving that the discharged superintendent arguably was not a supervisor but an employee protected by the NLRA. See id. at 1916.
Despite its holding that preemption did not apply, and its characterization of the case as
procedural, the Court as Davis sent yet another signal in favor of a return to a strong labor
preemption doctrine. By rejecting the Alabama court's holding that a labor preemption argument could be waived, and recognizing the jurisdictional nature of the defense, the Court
struck another blow in favor of Hamiltonian federalism in labor law jurisprudence.
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considered alone, but cumulatively they overwhelmed both the
doctrine and national labor policy.
Optimally, the primacy of federal law should be the norm in labor law theory and practice, and exceptions should be limited
strictly to cases of labor violence and of direct, aggravated threats
to local health, safety, and welfare. 96 Although the labor preemptaon doctrine cannot be absolute, it should be broad enough to ensure national solutions to national problems while remaining flexible enough "to be adaptable to a multitude of variant
situations."39 A strong labor preemption doctrine may be difficult,
but not impossible, to achieve. As one commentator aptly noted:
Achieving a permanent accommodation between state and federal power over the labor disputes of employers subject to the
National Labor Relations Act is like trying to keep a saddle on a
jellyfish. If the doctrine of federal preemption is to fit properly,
it must be constantly adjusted as the living creature of labor relations moves and grows.398
A return to the twin wings of the doctrine-the primary jurisdiction approach of Garmon and the unregulable activity approach of
Machinists-with allowance for a few exceptions to ensure proper
flexibility and healthy pluralism, is essential. Despite its politicization,399 the NLRB is the only present body with the expertise necessary to make sophisticated labor law decisions with any real continuity Revitalization of the preemption doctrine will prevent the
destructive impact of fragmented, atomistic state decisions and at
least partially restore the integrity and stability of labor law
jurisprudence.
Fortunately, 1986 may have marked a turning point in the history of labor preemption. Building on earlier decisions that had
396.
397.
398.
399.

See Wellington, supra note 27, at 549-56.
Michelman, supra note 27, at 651.
Comment, Concurrent Jurisdiction,supra note 151, at 373.
The NLRB has been politicized throughout its history. See supra note 9. Politiciza-

tion is an inevitable result when the President appoints NLRB members, but that result is
proper because it at least indirectly ensures political accountability to the electorate. Of

course, NLRB politicization also ensures permanent controversy. See Gould, Fifty Years
Under the National Labor Relations Act: A Retrospective View, 37 LAB. L.J. 235, 243
(1986). For comprehensive discussions of the merits and liabilities of NLRB politicization,
see Gregory, supra note 9; Gregory & Mak, supra note 7.
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triggered hopes for restoration of a sound Hamiltonian approach to
labor policymaking, the Burger Court may have initiated the
renaissance of the labor preemption doctrine. Although the Burger
Court's latest decisions did not constitute a clear and complete rejection of its former counterproductive ad hoc approach, these pronouncements did at least offer hope for eventual restoration of a
principled, broad labor preemption doctrine that, in turn, could
usher a coordinated labor law jurisprudence into the next century
The tning of these encouraging developments, in bursts of nationalistic spirit on the eve of the Rehnquist Court's inaugural, is
deeply ironic. Given the Court's unequivocal and nearly unanimous
stance during 1986 in favor of a strong labor preemption doctrine,
the Rehnquist-Scalia Jeffersonian wing of the embryonic Rehnquist Court probably will not soon be able to neutralize the Burger
Court's recent steps toward Hamiltonian restoration of the doctrine. Whether the mature Rehnquist Court will be able to thwart
the full reemergence of strong labor preemption principles, however, remains to be seen. The tensions are obvious and the policy
implications are profound, which will make the future interesting
indeed. Within the next few years, the Court almost certainly will
decide whether 1986 marked the renaissance of a strong labor preemption doctrine, or its last hurrah. One hopes that, on the eve of
the constitutional bicentennial, the Court will choose restoration of
Hamiltonian principles in labor law jurisprudence.

